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ABSTRACT 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the primary tool used by 
policymakers to inform administrative decisionmaking. Yet its 
methodology of converting preferences (often hypothetical ones) into 
dollar figures, then using those dollar figures as proxies for quality of 
life, creates significant systemic errors. These problems have been 
lamented by many scholars, and recent calls have gone out from 
world leaders and prominent economists to find an alternative 
analytical device that would measure quality of life more directly. 
This Article proposes well-being analysis (WBA) as that alternative. 
Relying on data from studies in the field of hedonic psychology that 
track people's actual experience of life-data that have consistently 
been found reliable and valid-WBA is able to provide the same 
policy guidance as CBA without CBA 's distortionary reliance upon 
predictions and dollar figures. We show how WBA can be 
implemented, and we catalog its advantages over CBA. In light of this 
comparison, we conclude that WBA should assume CBA 's role as the 
decisionmaking tool of choice for administrative regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Virtually every law makes people's lives better in some ways but 
worse in others. For example, a clean-air law could make people 
healthier, but it could also force them to pay more money for the 
products they buy.1 Every proposed law thus raises the question: 
Would its benefits outweigh its costs?2 
To answer that question, there needs to be a way of comparing 
seemingly incommensurable things like health and buying power. The 
most common method is to ask how much money people are willing 
to pay for benefits like improved health ( or how much money they 
are willing to accept for negatives like increased risks to their health). 
Suppose, for example, it could be determined that people are willing 
to pay $100 more per year in return for the health benefits of cleaner 
air. Those benefits could then be compared, by this first approach, to 
increased consumer costs. 
This approach is called cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and it has 
long been the dominant method of systematic analysis for evaluating 
government policy.3 Every economically significant regulation from 
1. The reason is that businesses may have to spend more money to produce their products 
in a way that avoids polluting. If so, then someone must bear that cost and have less buying 
power as a result. It might be consumers (via higher prices), employees (via lower wages or job 
cuts), or business owners (via lower profits); but it must be someone. 
Economic analysis of the effect of price increases on welfare can be complicated, 
because the effect may depend upon how consumers are likely to react to an increase in a 
specific context. Whether income effects or substitution effects predominate will vary. For 
simplicity, we refer here to reductions in buying power as an example of a potential cost or 
negative consequence of regulation, without specifying the complications from possible 
substitution effects. 
2. This question is typically the first step in analyzing a law, but other steps may follow . 
We use the terms "costs" and "benefits" to refer to a law's effects on people's quality of life, and 
such effects may not be the only consideration in evaluating a law. For example, there may be 
moral reasons to support a law even if it would decrease human welfare. Thus, this Article 
concerns one step in the decisionmaking process, the step of assessing a law's effects on the 
quality of human life. It is an important step, but not necessarily the only one. 
3. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is an alternative that has been used as well, albeit far 
less frequently than CBA, by government agencies in the United States. We discuss CEA in 
some detail later in this Article in the context of assessing quality-adjusted life years (QAL Ys), 
which are CEA's primary measure of outcomes. See infra Part IV.B.2. Other methods of 
systematic evaluation, such as multi-attribute analysis, exist as well, though they are even less 
commonly used by U.S. government regulators than is CEA. 
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executive-branch agencies must, by law, be evaluated via CBA4 (or in 
some cases via cost-effectiveness analysis). 5 This has been the case 
since 1981, when President Reagan mandated it by executive order.6 
That order has been reaffirmed by every president since, including 
Presidents Clinton7 and Obama.8 
Despite CBA's prominence, however, it has been criticized 
harshly from the moment it was first required by executive order9 to 
the present day,1° and countless times in between. 11 More often than 
not, the criticisms are scathing.12 Indeed, even CBA's most prominent 
defenders have written entire books and major articles prompted by 
their own acknowledgments of CBA's flaws. 13 
4. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012). 
5. Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
note at 745 (2006); Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866, 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, (Jan. 11, 1996), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
inforeg_riaguide. Regarding CEA, see supra note 3 and our discussion of QAL Ys infra Part 
IV.B.2. 
6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 431 
(1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638. 
7. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638. 
8. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215. 
9. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION, 
Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33, 33 (" In areas of environmental, safety, and health regulation, there may be 
many instances where a certain decision might be right even though its benefits do not outweigh 
its costs.") . 
10. See, e.g. , Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism?: The Positive and Normative 
Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 Hous. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011). 
11. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997); Robert H. Frank, Why Is 
Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000) (evaluating the various 
objections to cost-benefit analysis); Daniel Kahneman & Jack Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods: 
The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON~ & MGMT. 57 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Thomas 
0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998) [hereinafter McGarity, A Cost-
Benefit State] ; Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing 
Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 179-91 
(1983); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999); Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-
Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004). 
12. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS 234 (2004) ("Cost-
benefit analysis of health and environmental policies trivializes the very values that gave rise to 
those policies in the first place."); Kennedy, supra note 11, at 388 ("[T]he program of generating 
a complete system of private law rules by application of the criterion of efficiency is 
incoherent."). 
13. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed. , 1997); REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston 
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Along these lines, an important if subsidiary contribution of this 
Article is to combine our own new criticisms of CBA with those of 
others to make the case that CBA suffers from limitations inherent to 
its methodology.14 The only method ever used to compare laws' pluses 
and minuses-the method that has been mandated for the past three 
decades-is flawed. 
Yet it survives. A primary reason for its survival is evident and 
voiced often: no comparably rigorous, quantitative, and workable 
alternative exists for commensurating a law's positive and negative 
consequences. 15 Since virtually any law will both help people and hurt 
them, an important element of deciding whether to enact it will 
typically be to weigh the good against the bad.16 Asking how much 
people are willing to pay for the good-and thereby converting all 
consequences into dollar figures-is viewed by many as the best 
option for rigorously attempting to commensurate the effects. 17 
In this Article, we propose an alternative method for comparing 
the positive and negative consequences of a law. This method, which 
we label "well-being analysis" (WBA), would analyze directly the 
effect of costs and benefits on people's quality of life. For example, 
clean-air laws would be assessed by comparing how much more 
people would enjoy their lives if they became healthier with how 
much less they would enjoy their lives if their buying power were 
Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009); RICHARD L. REVESZ & 
MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN 
BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. 
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999); Robert H . Frank & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U . CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001); Robert W. 
Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper 
and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000). 
14. See infra Parts III and V. Those Parts also advance our primary objective, which is to 
show the superiority of the alternative we propose. In contrasting the two methods, we consider 
not only CBA as it is now practiced but also the proposed improvements to it that have been 
advanced by CBA's defenders. 
15. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13; REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13. One of us 
has argued to this effect before. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility 
Analysis, 77 U . CHI. L. REV. 657, 710 (2010). 
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
17. In ultimate policymaking decisions, CBA is very often combined with non-monetized 
qualitative considerations-as authorized by the executive orders themselves. But it is the 
monetization that primarily differentiates CBA from mere intuitionistic decision analysis, 
because the monetization constitutes an attempt to directly and fully commensurate negative 
and positive consequences. This is the foundation of CBA's appeal, and it is the thing to which 
we offer an alternative here. 
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reduced. 18 This is the most natural and direct way to put seemingly 
incommensurable things on the same scale. And it yields the specific 
answer that is needed: whether a law will make people's actual 
experience of life better or worse on the whole. 
Until now, this sort of direct assessment has been assumed to be 
impossible. But it has been made feasible by the emergence of a new 
field within social science known as hedonic psychology. Hedonics is 
the study of how people experience their lives, and in particular the 
measurement of how much any factor improves or worsens that 
experience. Originally, some critics questioned whether hedonic 
studies could credibly measure the quality of people's experiences.19 
But over the past fifteen years, these critics have been quieted by the 
success of such studies in producing replicable results that pass social 
science's rigorous tests of validity.20 
Accordingly, there have been widespread calls for the findings of 
hedonic psychology to be used to inform government policy. The 
United Nations General Assembly recently passed a resolution urging 
countries "to pursue the elaboration of additional measures that 
better capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness and well-
being ... with a view to guiding their public policies. "21 This view has 
also been endorsed by Great Britain's Prime Minister David 
Cameron,22 France's then-President Nicolas Sarkozy,23 three widely 
divergent winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics,24 and a recent 
18. Again, we refer to "buying power" because it is a simple way to signify the economic 
cost. We mean the term to include, not to ignore, the potential complications introduced by 
considerations such as the extent to which consumers are able to substitute other goods for 
those whose prices will increase. See supra note 1. 
19. Daniel Kahneman, Peter Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations of 
Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375, 379 (1997) ("The view that hedonic states cannot be 
measured because they are private events is widely held .... ") . 
20. See infra Part 11.B. 
21. G.A. Res. 65/309, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/309 (July 19, 2011). The resolution 
contrasted such new measures with "the gross domestic product indicator," which "was not 
designed to and does not adequately reflect the happiness and well-being of people in a 
country." Id. 
22. Roger Cohen, Op-Ed., The Happynomics of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at 12. 
23. Henry Samuel, Nicolas Sarkozy Wants To Measure Economic Success in 'Happiness,' 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 14, 2009, 6:24 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/europe/france/6189530/Nicolas-Sarkozy-wants-to-measure-economic-success-
in-happiness.html. 
24. They are Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Daniel Kahneman. See JOSEPH E. 
STIGLJTZ, AMARTYA SEN ~ JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE 
MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf; Daniel Kahneman & Robert 
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president of Harvard University.25 The U.S. government, as well as 
several states and localities, has begun exploring the possibility of 
using hedonic data to formulate policy.26 
To make this a reality, however, a methodology must be created 
for using the data from hedonic psychology to evaluate prospective 
laws.27 We create such a methodology in this Article, and we show 
how it can be used to analyze the same regulations currently assessed 
by CBA.28 We then explain how many of the flaws of CBA, some of 
which have long been recognized and others of which we expose here, 
would be corrected by WBA. 29 
Policymaking and social science are not like mathematics, and 
thus any of their tools will have imperfections. WBA is no exception, 
as we acknowledge in the ensuing Parts. However, WBA cures many 
of the largest problems of CBA. It is capable of immediate 
Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 
161, 178 n.11 (2005). 
25. DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM 
THE NEW RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING 45 (2010). In legal scholarship, Adam Kolber has done 
pioneering work in elucidating the value that experiential measures can bring to the law. See, 
e.g., Adam Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 588 (2011) ("My 
central claim is that as new technologies emerge to better reveal people 's experiences, the law 
ought to do more to take these experiences into account."). Kolber has focused more on 
neuroscientific measures than on those of hedonic psychology, and more on the civil- and 
criminal-justice systems than on administrative rulemaking, but he places the same emphasis on 
experiential measurement that we endorse here and throughout our work. 
26. OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 46 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/20ll_cb/201 l_cba_report.pdf ("OMB 
continues to investigate the relevant [hedonic] literature and to explore, in a preliminary way, its 
possible implications for improving regulatory policy in ways that promote the goals of 
economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation."); Wendy Koch, If Money 
Doesn't Buy Happiness, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2012, available at http://usatoday30. 
usatoday .com/NEWS/usaedition/2012-08-02-Gross-national-happiness_ CV_ U .htm (listing 
several cities and states that have begun to consider using hedonic data in governmental 
decisionmaking). 
27. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as 
Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1628-41 (2010); Anthony Vitarelli , Note, Happiness Metrics in 
Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115, 133 (2010) ("Despite the proliferation of these 
metrics, a core challenge remains-creating a useful translation between the happiness 
measures and traditional measures of economic cost."). Vitarelli suggests that hedonic metrics 
be used to supplement cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 127. Although we take a somewhat more 
optimistic view of the hedonic measures and a somewhat more pessimistic view of CBA than he 
does, this Article answers his call for a way to use the hedonic metrics to evaluate regulations. 
28. See infra Part II. 
29. See infra Parts III-V. 
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implementation, and even in its infancy, it may be able to produce 
analyses more accurate than the ones CBA now produces after three 
decades of refinement.30 We demonstrate this point directly by using 
WBA to reengineer an actual CBA that was used to assess a clean-
water regulation.31 
In Part I, we provide an overview of CBA and its methodology. 
In Part II, we explain how WBA would work in practice and the data 
upon which it would rely. In doing so, we contrast an actual CBA 
with a prototype of a WBA for the same regulation. The following 
Parts address the major problems with CBA that undermine its 
reliability and validity, and they suggest how WBA solves these 
problems. Part III addresses the shortcomings of CBA's use of stated 
and revealed preferences as proxies for well-being, Part IV focuses on 
limitations in the way that CBA defines the value of life, and Part V 
addresses issues associated with discounting the value of future 
money. At each step, we explain the ways in which WBA would 
overcome many of CBA's shortcomings and potentially provide a 
more accurate accounting of a prospective policy's effects on the 
quality of life. 
I. How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS WORKS, AND ITS 
CORE LIMITATION 
How do elected officials and regulators decide which policies to 
enact? They are surely influenced by political considerations,32 and 
they may also have ideological commitments. But at least in some 
cases, they simply want to make good policy. And even when politics 
or ideology constrains a choice, a range of acceptable options 
typically remains.33 Accordingly, regulators and elected officials and 
their staffs devote substantial time to identifying which policies are 
worth undertaking.34 
30. This is due to the advantages of WBA, discussed throughout this Article, that stem 
from its use of a better proxy for welfare than CBA uses. Of course, the accuracy of any given 
CBA or WBA will depend in part upon the quality of the methods used, which may vary 
according to the available data and other considerations. 
31. See infra Part II.C. 
32. Examples of such considerations would be pleasing their constituents and campaign 
donors, even in cases in which doing so is at odds with the public good. 
33. At a minimum, it is useful to know what the best policy would be before deciding how 
to weigh that consideration against others. 
34. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (describing the civic republican model as one in which 
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Before they even begin, they must define what makes a policy 
worthwhile. A metaphysically correct definition of worth, if such a 
thing exists, may be beyond humanity's current grasp. However, there 
is widespread agreement that improving the quality of human life is at 
least an important component. Because virtually everyone deems it 
desirable to make people's lives better, at least when all else is equal, 
that has become the primary focus of policy analysis.35 What it means 
to make someone's life better is, in turn, a potentially difficult 
question. 
In a previous article, we argued that a person's quality of life-
or, as it is more commonly labeled in economics, "welfare" or "well-
being"-is simply the sum of the positive and negative feelings she 
experiences throughout her lifetime.36 This view differs from those 
held by some economists (who view welfare as preference 
satisfaction-that is, getting what one wants) and some philosophers 
(who view welfare as the attainment of certain objective qualities or 
capabilities).37 Importantly, however, the different conceptions of 
welfare overlap in practice far more than they diverge.38 The question, 
then, is not what it means to make life better, but rather how to 
decide which policy would do so. 
A. CBA and Welfare 
Understanding whether a regulation does, in fact, improve 
quality of life is often difficult. At least theoretically, a new policy 
may improve the lives of a group of people without negatively 
"government 's primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering 
preferences and to reach consensus on the common good"). 
35. Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 177. 
36. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1590--95. We use the terms "welfare" 
and "well-being" interchangeably throughout this Article. 
37. Id. at 1601-27. 
38. Id. at 1588, 1610, 1617. For instance, there is evidence that when selecting among 
different plans, people generally choose the option that they believe will make them happiest. 
Daniel J. Benjamin et al., What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think 
You Would Choose?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2083, 2107 (2012). This in turn implies that 
preferentist and hedonic views of welfare are closely related. In limited circumstances, one's 
conception of welfare could affect whether one views cost-benefit analysis or well-being analysis 
as a better proxy for it. For example, a person might want outcome A, but only because she 
mistakenly believes that it will bring her more pleasure than outcome B. An economist who 
takes the view that she would be better off getting what she wants, even when her preference is 
based on a mistake, may be more likely than others to deem CBA a closer proxy for welfare 
than WBA. We think that most people reject this view. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra 
note 27, at 1617-18. 
1612 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1603 
impacting anyone.39 In almost every case, however, the benefits of a 
regulation to one group of people will come at the expense of costs 
borne by either the same or another group of people.40 Policymakers 
thus need a tool that can tell them whether a proposed law or 
regulation would improve the overall quality of human life. That is, 
would the policy help those who benefit more than it would hurt 
those who are harmed?41 
Suppose a regulation would reduce the amount of chemical 
pollution emitted into the waterways and thereby reduce the number 
of people who die of cancer from the chemical. In so doing, however, 
it would increase the cost of manufacturing some good, forcing the 
millions of consumers who purchase it to pay more per person for the 
good. Whether the benefit of reducing cancer rates is greater than the 
cost of increasing the prices that consumers must pay depends, in 
part, on the respective effects of health and consumer purchases on 
human welfare. 
CBA provides a method for comparing such seemingly 
incommensurable values. Its solution is to convert all costs and 
benefits into a uniform metric, monetary value, by figuring out how 
much money people would be willing to pay for the positives that 
regulations can give them. Via this method, an agency can monetize 
the value of health and compare it to the monetary value of 
consuming goods. 
Imagine that the clean-water regulation would save ten lives42 per 
year, but that it would also drive up manufacturing costs substantially. 
39. We know of no such Pareto-optimal regulations. 
40. Most theories of CBA do not equate this kind of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with ultimate 
"rightness" because factors other than wealth maximization could affect such rightness. See 
Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 195 ("[W]e conceive of CBA as a decision procedure, not as a 
criterion of moral rightness or goodness."). Still, learning whether a regulation would increase 
or decrease quality of life in the aggregate is widely viewed as an important part of assessing its 
desirability. 
41. Again, increasing overall well-being need not be the only goal of policymaking. It may 
be weighed against considerations such as the distribution of well-being, as well as values 
independent of human well-being. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 52-61; Bronsteen 
Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1589-90. Because overall well-being is one important 
consideration, however, both CBA and WBA are designed exclusively to measure it. 
42. Those who perform CBA often object to characterizing a regulation as "saving lives" 
for two reasons. First, a life cannot be saved, but merely prolonged; and second, a regulation 
simply reduces the risk to a population of people rather than prolonging the lives of specific, 
pre-identified individuals. We do not view either of these points as a reason to avoid the term 
"saving lives. " 
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Each of the 1 million consumers who purchase the affected good 
would have to pay $50 more per year to acquire that product. CBA 
asks whether it is worth spending $50 million ($50/person x 1 million 
people) to save 10 lives. To answer this question, CBA must place a 
price on the lives being saved. 
To find out the cost people would be willing to pay for any type 
of regulatory benefit, such as avoiding the loss of life from cancer, 
CBA has two methods available. The first is "revealed preferences"43 
and the second is "stated preferences," the latter of which is most 
commonly determined by contingent valuation surveys that ask 
people how much they would be willing to pay for a benefit.44 
Revealed preferences are available when people have been faced 
with an opportunity to choose between some regulatory benefit and 
some amount of money in their actual lives, such that CBA can 
simply observe which option they chose. Their decision is said to 
reveal whether they prefer, for example, having more money or 
reducing their risk of death. Identifying that preference enables 
regulators to place a value on something like increased water quality, 
because it shows how much money people are willing to spend in 
order to minimize or eliminate a risk to their life. When they are 
available, revealed preferences are typically preferred to stated 
preferences, although this is not an absolute: a high-quality stated-
The first point is one that we take very seriously and discuss later in this Article as an 
advantage of WBA, because WBA counts heavily the likely number of years by which lives are 
prolonged on average by given regulations, whereas the most common form of CBA does not. 
See infra Part IV.B.l. Moreover, everyone understands that people do not live forever, yet 
"saving lives" is a widely used term. When a firefighter pulls someone out of a burning building, 
it is typical and in no way misleading to say that he saved the person's life rather than that he 
merely prolonged it. 
As for the second point, we believe that if a regulation will eliminate a death risk of l-
in-10,000 to a population of 1,000,000 people, then it is best to characterize that as an estimated 
prospective benefit of saving 100 lives. To a significant degree, CBA effectively does this, 
regardless of the terminology it chooses. It is true that people are willing to pay more money to 
save identified individuals than they are to reduce statistical risks (whose reduction ends up 
saving as-yet-unspecified individuals), and the animating principles of CBA dictate that this 
matters. But as we explain later in this Article, we consider that a flaw in CBA rather than a 
problem with the term "saving lives." 
43. See infra Part III .A. 
44. See infra Part III.B. Another stated-preference method is choice experiments. They 
have been used far less frequently than contingent valuation surveys, but this may be starting to 
change. In any event, choice experiments are vulnerable to many of the same problems we 
discuss with contingent valuation surveys, and certainly to the same overarching disadvantages 
of CBA vis-a-vis WBA. To wit, they rely on predictions of welfare rather than in-the-moment 
measures of welfare. 
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preference study may be chosen over a lower-quality revealed 
preference study. 
When analyzing actual regulations with trade-offs like those of 
the clean-water regulation mentioned above, economists performing 
CBA would typically use the revealed preference method.45 They 
would look for a real-life situation in which people have chosen 
between having more money and avoiding a low-probability risk of 
death. Such a situation is said to arise when people choose their jobs, 
because one thing that differentiates jobs is the degree of mortality 
risk that they entail. Being a firefighter, for example, is more 
dangerous than being an accountant. CBA's idea is as follows. First, it 
uses statistical analysis to try to identify two jobs that are the same in 
every way except two: Job A is riskier than Job B, and to compensate 
for that risk, Job A pays more than Job B. People who choose Job A 
rather than Job B are said to have willingly accepted a somewhat 
higher risk of death ( one that is low probability in absolute terms, but 
still higher than the risk in other jobs) in return for the benefit of 
higher wages. The amount of extra money that they make is the 
revealed market value of risk avoidance. If a job with a 1-in-10,000 
annual risk of death pays $600 more annually than an otherwise 
comparable job with no risk (the hypothetical no-risk job is used here 
for simplicity of explication), then the value of avoiding such a risk is 
pegged at $600. Accordingly, society would collectively be willing to 
spend $6 million ($600 multiplied by 10,000) for each life saved.46 
Indeed, this is close to the actual number that economists employing 
CBA have produced.47 A regulation that will save 10 lives is thus 
deemed to increase overall well-being if and only if it costs consumers 
a collective total of $60 million or less. 
45. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and 
Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 586 (2004) ("[W)hatever 
preferences individuals seem to reveal through their market behavior are taken to be the best 
measure of true 'wants' or 'desires' and, therefore, also are taken exclusively to provide the 
valuation inputs that in critical part determine the policy outputs of CBA."). 
46. Avoiding the risk is worth $600, but the regulators know that a certain number of 
people are likely to actually die without the regulation. Therefore, they need to know how much 
society is willing to pay to save those lives. If avoiding a 1-in-10,000 risk is worth $600, then 
avoiding an actual death (that is, a l-in-1 "risk") is worth $6 million ($600 x 10,000). 
47. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, How To Value A Life, 32 J. ECON. & FIN. 311, 312-14 (2008); see 
also, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 815-R-00-026, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER 
RULE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-28 (2000) (estimating the value of a statistical life at $6.1 
million). 
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If no revealed preference were available, then CBA would call 
for the use of a contingent valuation study. This would entail giving 
people surveys that ask how much money they would be willing to 
spend in return for avoiding a 1-in-10,000 risk of death. These surveys 
have also been used, for example, to learn people's willingness to pay 
for things like preserving the lives of endangered species.48 
B. The Core Advantage of WBA over CBA 
CBA is based on this idea: how much money a person is willing 
to pay for a thing shows how much the thing increases her welfare. 
But that is not true. When someone buys a thing in the hope of 
improving her welfare, she has made a prediction-a guess-about 
how the thing will affect her. That prediction may well be wrong, and 
indeed it usually is. Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson's pioneering 
work has demonstrated that people are not good at predicting how 
their choices will affect how they feel in the future. 49 
By contrast, people are good at reporting how they feel right 
now. In-the-moment self-reports pass the same tests of reliability and 
validity that are failed by affective predictions.50 This should not be 
surprising; guessing how you will feel in the future is of course more 
error-prone than saying how you feel now. And the reasons for this 
are apparent: "[The mind's] simulations are deficient because they 
are based on a small number of memories, they omit large numbers of 
features, they do not sustain themselves over time, and they lack 
context. Compared to sensory perceptions, mental simulations are 
mere cardboard cut-outs of reality. "51 
Thus, a decision tool will be better at approximating welfare if it 
is based on self-assessments of how people feel in the moment than if 
it is based on predictions of how people will feel in the future. This is 
the central insight behind well-being analysis and its primary 
advantage over cost-benefit analysis.52 
48. E.g. , John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered 
Species: Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICALECON. 197, 203 (1996). 
49. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D . Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 
317 SCI. 1351, 1354 (2007); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert , Affective Forecasting: 
Knowing What To Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005). 
50. See infra Part 11.B. 
51. Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 49, at 1354 (emphasis added). 
52. Even if feeling good is not identical to welfare, few would deny that it is at minimum a 
major part of welfare. Indeed, when CBA's proponents delineate which preferences count 
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II. WELL-BEING ANALYSIS 
Defenders of CBA have long argued that, despite its flaws, cost-
benefit analysis is the best available means for determining the 
welfare effects of a project or regulation.53 That may no longer be the 
case. We propose here an alternative method for analyzing regulatory 
policy: well-being analysis (WBA). WBA shares the basic framework 
of CBA, that of comparing costs and benefits, but it differs in the data 
and analytical tools it employs to make such comparisons. 
Instead of monetlzmg the effects of regulation, WBA 
"hedonizes" them. That is, it measures how much a regulation raises 
or lowers people's enjoyment of life. For example, if a regulation 
would result in improved health but higher prices of products, then 
WBA would compare how much more people enjoy their lives when 
they are made healthier with how much less they enjoy their lives 
when their buying power decreases. 
Like CBA, WBA is a tool for analyzing the welfare effects of 
policies-not a panacea meant to be the last word on what should be 
done. Policy analysis often proceeds by analyzing welfare effects and 
then weighing those effects against whatever other considerations are 
deemed relevant by regulators, legislators, and the citizenry they 
serve,
54 including fairness, justice, and human dignity.55 Our 
contribution is to try to improve upon the first step of the process, the 
step in which welfare effects are measured. This would influence 
policy, but it in no way implies that we think the first step is the only 
step. Like proponents of CBA, we acknowledge the role that other 
considerations may play.56 
toward welfare, the result ends up looking remarkably like those preferences that result in 
feeling good. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1622-27. 
Moreover, even informed and accurate preferences are likely to be further removed 
from welfare than is happiness because many of those preferences are not self-interested. When 
someone expresses a preference by her willingness to pay for something, that preference is not 
necessarily aimed at increasing her own welfare (and thus should be excluded by CBA, which is 
a tool for welfare assessment). 
53. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13. 
54. See Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 245 ("CBA does not capture, and is not meant to 
capture, nonwelfarist considerations."). 
55. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012). 
56. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 53 (noting the possible roles of "moral rights, 
the fair distribution of welfare, and even moral considerations wholly detached from welfare, 
such as intrinsic environmental values" that could be considered alongside the value of 
aggregate welfare when making public policy). 
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Subsequent Parts of this Article argue that WBA solves many of 
the conceptual and methodological problems facing CBA. This Part 
introduces WBA and explains the sources, validity, and reliability of 
its data. 
A. WBA: The Basic Framework 
WBA directly analyzes the effects of regulations on people's 
quality of life. To do that, it relies on hedonic-psychology data that 
measure how different factors affect people's enjoyment of their lives. 
In theory, such measures could perhaps be purely neurological-
taken by a machine that reports how good someone feels at all times. 
But unless and until that sort of technology is created, psychologists 
must rely instead on individuals' personal assessments of how their 
lives are going for them at a particular moment in time. Fortunately, 
these self-assessments can be taken in ways that yield highly reliable 
results, as we explain in detail in the following Section. 
Individuals' self-assessments indicate their level of subjective 
well-being (SWB), or "happiness." Recently, psychologists and 
economists have developed increasingly sophisticated surveying and 
statistical methods that enable the collection and analysis of well-
being data on a large scale.57 WBA uses these data to evaluate the 
welfare consequences of regulations by comparing the well-being 
gains and losses of affected parties. This Section explains the 
conceptual framework behind WBA, whereas the following Section 
discusses the data upon which WBA relies. The final Section of Part 
II explains how the data would be used in the actual performance of 
WBA. 
WBA relies on the same basic cost-benefit-weighing principle 
that undergirds CBA: all else equal, regulations whose benefits 
exceed their costs are valuable because they enhance overall welfare. 
The main difference between the two techniques involves the way in 
which costs and benefits are calculated and compared. Regulations 
involve both market and nonmarket costs and benefits. For CBA, 
market effects are relatively easy to handle, because computing their 
monetary value is straightforward. Nonmarket effects, however, are 
more difficult for CBA. As we will describe in greater detail, CBA 
must apply a variety of problematic tools to monetize the value of 
57. Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz, Preface to WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix, xii (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert 
Schwarz eds., 1999). 
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health, lives, and the environment. WBA avoids many of these 
difficulties by looking directly to a regulation's effects on people's 
experiences and lives. In WBA, all effects of a regulation are 
hedonized, which is to say that they are converted into units directly 
measuring their impact on the subjective well-being of the affected 
parties. The positive and negative hedonic impacts can then be 
compared with one another. They are the relevant costs and benefits. 
Instead of converting regulatory effects into monetary values, 
WBA converts them into well-being units (WBUs). WBUs are 
intended to be subjective, hedonic, cardinal, and interpersonally 
comparable units that indicate the degree of a person's happiness for 
a given period of time. They are, in some respects, similar to the 
quality-adjusted life years (QAL Ys) that are increasingly popular in 
health economics.58 
WBA maps a person's SWB onto a scale that would ideally run 
from -10 to 10, in which 10 indicates perfect happiness (subjectively 
defined), -10 indicates perfect misery, and O indicates neutrality or the 
absence of experience. This type of scale would allow individuals to 
register experiences that are worse than nonexperience (undergoing a 
root canal, for instance) and would simplify the comparison between 
experience and nonexperience. Most of the well-being data that have 
been collected to date have employed a scale from O to 10.59 
Accordingly, in the WBA that we conduct below, we utilize a scale 
running from O to 10. As the science of WBA evolves, we would 
envision transitioning to the preferred -10 to 10 scale.60 
Each decile of the scale is equivalent and indicates a 10 percent 
change in the person's SWB.61 Moreover, we treat the scale as 
identical across individuals, although, of course, the kinds of things 
that affect different individuals' SWB may not be.62 One WBU is 
equivalent to 1.0 on the scale for a period of one year. Thus, if a 
person lives to the age of 100 and has an SWB of 7.0 for each year, 
58. In Part IV we describe the differences between QAL Ys and WBUs and the advantages 
of the latter. 
59. See Richard R. Layard, G . Mayraz & S. Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. 
PUB. E CON. 1846, 1848 tbl.1 (2008) (collecting examples of well-being studies). Scales from Oto 
7 are also common. 
60. Converting from one scale to another is also possible by using studies that pose the 
same questions to the same (or comparable) individuals on different scales. 
61. This requires that the scale be intrapersonally cardinal. 
62. This requires that the scale be interpersonally cardinal. We discuss the issues raised by 
this cardinality requirement in greater detail in Part 11.B.4. 
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that person has experienced 700 WBUs (7.0 WBU/year x 100 years). 
If an event such as illness causes a person's SWB to drop from 7.0 to 
5.5 for a period of ten years, that person loses 15 WBUs (1.5 
WBU/year x 10 years) over her lifetime. 
This type of scale has significant benefits for any type of decision 
analysis, particularly regulatory analysis, because it enables the direct 
comparison of the hedonic impact of proposed policy changes. 
Imagine, for example, that the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) is contemplating a simple regulation of 
workplace safety that will prevent 100 workers from each losing an 
arm while on the job. Implementing such a measure, however, will 
increase the costs of production and force factories to fire 300 
workers in the affected industry. 
CBA would attempt to calculate the value of the regulation by 
monetizing the costs and benefits it generates. With respect to the 
costs, CBA would in theory be able to estimate the lost wages of the 
300 unemployed people.63 The benefits, however, are trickier. 
Establishing a market price for the value of an arm is a fraught 
enterprise.64 Given these shortcomings, the value CBA applies to the 
loss of an arm will be beset by a number of systematic errors 
associated with wealth effects, labor-market effects, and people's 
poor ability to predict how events like losing an arm will affect them. 
Accordingly, CBA may substantially and systematically misstate the 
benefits of the regulation. 
WBA would approach the measure in the same general fashion 
but with different analytical data. Like CBA, WBA would attempt to 
quantify the cost of unemployment. But instead of looking solely to 
the workers' lost wages, it would calculate the hedonic cost of being 
unemployed.65 Some data suggest that unemployment has a significant 
effect on well-being.66 Thus, the welfare costs of unemployment may 
be much greater than CBA predicts. On the other side of the ledger, 
63. In practice, however, CBA typically ignores the costs associated with unemployment. 
See infra Part II.C. 
64. We discuss the many possible shortcomings of CBA's attempts to do so in Part III. 
65. CBA could, in theory, use contingent valuation studies to estimate in monetary terms 
these hedonic consequences, but this does not currently happen as a matter of standard practice. 
In addition, such studies would suffer from the same kinds of problems, notably affective 
forecasting errors, that affect contingent valuation generally. 
66. See Richard E . Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis & Ed Diener, 
Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8, 12 (2004); infra 
Part II.C. 
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WBA is well positioned to hedonize the benefits of the regulation. 
Studies of people who have lost limbs provide fairly accurate 
information on the hedonic loss associated with losing an arm ( and 
thus the benefits of avoiding these losses).67 Again, the results are 
likely to be different from those determined by CBA. Studies show 
that individuals who lose limbs often adapt substantially to their new 
condition, recovering most of their lost happiness within a few years.68 
This result is contrary to the predictions of healthy people, who 
typically assume that such disabilities will be devastating and discount 
the possibility that they will adapt to the loss.69 Accordingly, the 
welfare benefits of the regulation may be overstated by CBA if 
contingent valuation or revealed preference surveys rely on 
mispredictions about hedonic adaptation.70 
Although this example suggests that the hypothetical OSHA 
regulation may be less valuable than CBA implies, in many other 
circumstances WBA will point in the direction of more stringent 
regulation than CBA would suggest. For many regulations, the chief 
benefits will involve extending human lives, and the major costs will 
come in the form of higher consumer prices. In the context of WBA, 
loss of life constitutes an enormous hedonic cost, whereas many 
studies indicate that money has a relatively small effect on well-
being.71 When money is traded off against life, therefore, WBA is 
likely to favor health and safety regulations more than does CBA. 
B. The Data ofWBA 
Social scientists have been attracted to the idea of measuring 
human welfare directly for a long time, but they have had difficulty 
67. For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see Shane 
Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 57, at 302, 311-18. 
68. Id. at 312. 
69. Peter A. Ube! , George Loewenstein & Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine: 
Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional 
Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005) ("One of the most 
commonly replicated 'happiness gaps' is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of 
people with health conditions and healthy people's estimates of what their quality of life would 
be if they had those conditions .... " (citation omitted)); Peter A. Ube! et al., Do Nonpatients 
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a 
Focusing Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190, 197 (2001). 
70. See infra Part III. 
71. Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not 
Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,492 (2010). 
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securing valid and reliable data.72 WBA is now feasible because of the 
availability of relevant data about the effects of different 
circumstances on individual well-being. Over the last decade or so, 
new social science techniques have emerged that enable researchers 
to study subjective well-being from a variety of different perspectives 
with a number of different tools.73 These techniques allow for a more 
or less direct measurement of people's happiness levels, overcoming 
the problem that had initially driven economists to seek monetary 
proxies for welfare.74 Importantly, they enable the measurement of 
what Daniel Kahneman has termed "experienced utility" (how good 
people feel) , in contrast to the "decision utility" that is typically 
studied in CBA.75 Decision utility measures only whether people get 
what they want, on the assumption that getting it will make them 
better off. But because that assumption has been shown to be deeply 
imperfect,76 Kahneman and others have turned toward measuring 
directly the quality of people's experience of life. This Section will 
briefly discuss a few of the most promising techniques for collecting 
such experiential data and their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
l. Life Satisfaction Surveys. The oldest method of measuring 
SWB is the life satisfaction survey. These types of surveys ask 
individuals to respond to a question such as, "All things considered, 
how satisfied with your life are you these days?"77 Respondents 
answer on a scale that ranges from "not very happy" to "very happy." 
Life satisfaction surveys have been included in the U.S. General 
Social Survey since the 1970s; as a result, we now have substantial 
quantities of longitudinal data on thousands of individuals.78 The 
principal value in such surveys is the ability to correlate SWB data 
with a variety of other facts about people's lives. Using multivariate 
regression analyses that control for different circumstances, 
72. E.g., David Colander, Retrospectives: Edgeworth's Hedonimeter and the Quest To 
Measure Utility, J . ECON. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 215, 215-16. 
73. For a review of well-being measures, see ED DIENER, RICHARD LUCAS, ULRICH 
SCHIMMACK & JOHN HELLIWELL, WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 46-66 (2009). 
74. See id. at 10-11. 
75. Kahneman et al. , supra note 19, at 375. 
76. See infra Part III .A.3. 
77. See William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 PSYCHOL. 
ASSESSMENT 164, 164 (1993) (discussing the strength of the Satisfaction with Life Scale and 
referring to the fact that it is a "judgmental process, in which individuals assess the quality of 
their lives on the basis of a unique set of criteria"). 
78. DIENER ET AL., supra note 73 Well-Being for Public Policy at 191. 
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researchers are able to estimate the strength of the correlations 
between SWB and factors such as income, divorce, unemployment, 
disability, and the death of family members.79 For example, on 
average, the death of a father will yield the loss of 0.25 life satisfaction 
points on a scale of 1 to 7 for a period of time, whereas the loss of a 
spouse will typically yield the loss of 0.89 points.80 
Life satisfaction surveys are relatively inexpensive to administer 
and can be easily included in a variety of larger survey instruments. 
Accordingly, they are most valuable as sources of large-scale data 
about many subjects and of longitudinal data about changes in SWB 
over time. The latter use is especially valuable in assessing the causal 
effects of life events (such as marriage, disability, or unemployment) 
on SWB, because the same individual can be surveyed both before 
and after the event. This eliminates the need for between-subjects 
comparisons.81 Life satisfaction surveys are less helpful, however, for 
assessing particularly granular changes in circumstances. More 
importantly, they rely on global judgments about how people's lives 
are going, rather than on those individuals' moment-by-moment 
hedonic experiences. Because hedonic experiences are often poorly 
remembered, such judgments can be biased because of a person's 
momentary mood82 or the order in which questions are posed, among 
other errors.83 
2. Experience Sampling Methods. Researchers sought to 
overcome the limitations of life satisfaction surveys by developing 
79. See, e.g., Andrew E . Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis & Richard E . Lucas, Lags 
and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J . F222, F231 
(2008); Richard E . Lucas, Yannis Georgellis, Andrew E. Clark & Ed Diener, Reexamining 
Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 527, 528 (2003); Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All 
Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945 , 
947-48 (2005). 
80. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of 
Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S217, S232 (2008). 
81. See Lucas et al., supra note 79, at 546. Between-subjects comparisons can be a problem 
if the two groups (for example, married people and single people) differ about more than just 
the comparison issue. Married people are not simply happier because they are married; the 
people who get married are more likely to have been happy people in the first place than the 
people who are single. Id. 
82. See Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur 
A. Stone, National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF DME USE AND WELL-BEING 9, 29 (Alan 
B. Krueger ed., 2009). 
83. See id. at 40. 
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techniques that enabled them to more directly measure people's 
emotions while they were being experienced. The gold standard of 
such measures is the experience sampling method (ESM), which uses 
handheld computers and iPhones to survey people about their 
experiences.84 Subjects are beeped randomly throughout the day and 
asked to record what they are doing and how they feel about it. The 
data that emerge from these studies provide a much more detailed 
picture of how people spend their time and how their experiences 
affect them. 85 
Despite their considerable value, ESM studies can be expensive 
to run.86 This is why researchers have sought other methods that 
produce most of the advantages of ESM but at a lower price. One 
such technique is the day reconstruction method (DRM) pioneered 
by Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues. The DRM uses daily diary 
entries about each day's experiences to reconstruct an account of 
subjects' emotional lives. DRM studies correlate strongly with ESM 
studies and can be run at lower cost.87 Similarly, the Princeton Affect 
aild Time Survey (PATS) asks subjects to report and evaluate their 
experiences from the previous day.88 It can be distributed via 
telephone and incorporated into other survey devices, enabling it to 
reach a larger population.89 
3. The Quality of Well-Being Data. The ability to generate data is 
not the same as the ability to actually measure the thing that one 
seeks to measure. Nor is it the ability to measure it well. Data are 
only useful if they are reliable and valid. Much of the remainder of 
this Article analyzes the reliability and validity of the valuation 
measures used by CBA. As a means of comparison, we now discuss 
the quality of the data upon which WBA will rely. 
Reliability is an indication of the consistency of a measurement 
instrument.9() For example, a scale that reported very similar numbers 
84. Id. at 30. 
85. Id. 
86. See, e.g., id. ("So far, however, real-time data collection has proved prohibitively 
expensive and burdensome to administer to large, representative samples. "). 
87. See Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & 
Arthur A. Stone, A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day 
Reconstruction Method, 306 SCI. 1776, 1776 (2004). 
88. Krueger et al., supra note 83, at 34-36. 
89. Id. at 36. 
90. DIENER ET AL. , supra note 73, at 68. 
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every time the same weight was placed on it would be judged highly 
reliable. In the context of well-being measures, reliability can be 
assessed by examining correlations between tests and retests of the 
same question at separate times, as well as correlations between 
different questions that ask about similar concepts.91 Meta-analyses of 
different well-being tools have found high levels of reliability for both 
life satisfaction and experience sampling methods.92 This is especially 
true of more advanced multi-item measures.93 
Just because a measure reliably provides consistent data does not 
mean that it is measuring what you want it to measure.94 The ability to 
actually measure the thing sought to be measured is called validity.95 
Although a full review of the validity of well-being measures is 
unnecessary here,96 it is worth noting a number of findings that 
support the conclusion that a person's well-being can be validly 
measured by the tools discussed in the previous Subsection. First, 
despite the rather different techniques used to collect data, the 
various measures of well-being tend to correlate with one another.97 
One's overall life satisfaction is correlated both with the amount of 
positive and negative affect that one feels98 and with one's satisfaction 
with the domains of one's life.99 Not only are subjective reports of 
well-being correlated with one another, they are also correlated with 
external measures, such as third-party informant reports,100 facial 
91. Id. at 71. 
92. Id. at 72-73. Test-retest reliability results typically range from r = 0.55 tor= 0.70. Id. at 
72. These are fairly high numbers, especially given the difficulty of using test-retest calculations 
on a measure of well-being that is likely to change significantly over time. 
93. Id. at 74. 
94. For example, a bathroom scale may provide highly reliable data-the same readout 
every time-but those data are probably not a very good measure of your well-being. 
95. See Samuel Messick, Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences 
from Persons' Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning, 50 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 741 , 741 (1995) ("Validity is an overall evaluative judgment of the degree to 
which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness 
of interpretations and actions on the basis of test scores or other modes of assessment." (citation 
omitted)). 
96. For such a review, see DIENER ET AL., supra note 73, at 74-93. 
97. Id. at 70. 
98. Michael Eid & Ed Diener, Global Judgments of Subjective Well-Being: Situational 
Variability and Long-Term Stability, 65 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 245, 245-46 (2004). 
99. Ulrich Schimmack, The Structure of Subjective Well-Being, in THE SCIENCE OF 
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 97, 97 (Michael Eid & Randy J. Larsen eds., 2007). 
100. See Heidi Lepper, Use of Other-Reports To Validate Subjective Well-Being Measures, 44 
Soc. INDICATORS REs. 367, 367 (1998) ("Objective reports allow researchers to evaluate 
whether the level of SWB reported by the individual is an enduring state and/or observable to 
2013] WBA vs. CBA 1625 
expressions,101 and neurological data. 102 Well-being measures also tend 
to be fairly stable over time and exhibit high test-retest reliability. 103 
But despite their overall stability,104 they are also sensitive to changes 
in life circumstances: people who experience apparently negative 
events do indeed report lower levels of well-being-at least for a 
time, before they adapt.105 Moreover, well-being scales can detect the 
relative magnitude of life events. For example, people who are more 
seriously injured predictably report lower happiness ratings than do 
people who are less seriously injured.106 This suggests both that people 
are capable of consistently reporting how experiences make them feel 
and that their emotional responses generally exhibit credible and 
predictable patterns following specific events. 
Just as CBA alternately relies upon revealed preference and 
contingent valuation studies, WBA would draw upon each of the data 
sources mentioned in the preceding Section. In some cases, 
longitudinal studies of overall well-being may provide the best data 
available for tracking people after events with potentially long-term 
effects. 107 These studies have been used, for example, by researchers 
to understand the hedonic impact of no-fault divorce laws on women 
others. "); Ed Sandvik, Ed Diener & Larry Seidlitz, Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and 
Stability of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures, 61 J. PERSONALITY 317, 322 (1993) 
("The reports of informants are likely to summarize emotional information expressed by 
subjects over time .... "). 
101. Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals, in 
WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 57, at 470, 479. 
102. Timothy G . Dinan, Glucocorticoids and the Genesis of Depressive Illness: A 
Psychobiological Model, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 365 (1994); Ito & Cacioppo, supra note 101. 
103. See Ed Diener & Richard E . Lucas, Personality and Subjective Well-Being, in WELL-
BEING, supra note 57, at 213, 213-14 (" [I]n spite of ... transitory influences, SWB is moderately 
stable across situations and across the life span . ... " ( citations omitted)). 
104. See Sandvik et al. , supra note 100, at 338-39 ("The present study clearly indicates that 
there are long-term consistencies in average mood .. . . "). 
105. See Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11. 
106. See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A 
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J . PUB. E CON . 
1061, 1066 (2008). This sensitivity to degree is in contrast to findings that people's responses to 
contingent valuation surveys used in CBA display considerable scope neglect, that is, they are 
willing to pay the same amount of money to save 2000, 20,000, or 200,000 endangered birds. 
William H . Desvousges, F. Reed Johnson, Richard W. Dunford, Sara P. Hudson & K. Nicole 
Wilson, Measuring Natural Resources with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and 
Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91 , 113 (Jerry A. Hausman 
ed., 1993). 
107. This would be the case if no comparable ESM or DRM studies had yet been done for 
the relevant conditions. 
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in different states. 108 In other circumstances, the availability of ESM 
studies will enable more fine-grained analyses of regulations' effects 
on people's lives. 
4. Criticisms of Well-Being Data. Economists and other 
defenders of CBA have raised a number of objections to well-being 
data, and before we proceed further it is worth addressing those 
objections. The first, and most important, is that well-being data lack 
interpersonal cardinality because different individuals may interpret 
the scales differently.109 For example, a 5.0 on one person's scale may 
not be the same as a 5.0 on another person's scale. If people interpret 
the hedonic scales differently, it becomes impossible to know whether 
one person's reported change from an SWB of 5.0 to 6.0 was 
equivalent to another person's reported change from 5.0 to 6.0. 
Although some limited evidence for concern about cardinality 
exists in certain contexts, methodological solutions to this problem 
are almost certainly available. First, differential use of the scale will 
only be a problem when that differential use is related to the 
populations being compared. For instance, imagine an agency using 
WBA to evaluate a project that will reduce traffic and commuting 
times on a highway. To determine the hedonic cost of commuting in 
traffic, the agency would compare the well-being of people while they 
are commuting with the well-being of people who are not commuting. 
Unless people who commute in traffic systematically use the hedonic 
scale differently from people who do not, different uses of the scale 
will simply show up as random noise. Variations among individuals in 
how they rate their own happiness-what they mean when they rate 
themselves a 5 or a 6, for instance-are likely to be random, not 
biased.110 This randomness should wash out across large numbers of 
108. See generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 267 (2006). 
109. See Matthew Adler & Eric A . Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis , 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. S253, S28[µll ("The question is whether the numerical scales used in SWB 
surveys correspond to a true, interpersonally comparable scale of happiness."). In fact , concerns 
about the interpersonal cardinality of utility pushed economists toward monetization in the first 
place. See William Nordhaus, Measuring Real Income with Leisure and Household Production , 
in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF nME 
USE AND WELL-BEING, supra note 83, at 125, 136. 
110. There is some reason to believe that citizens of different nations with vastly different 
cultures will treat happiness surveys systematically differently. See Ed Diener & Eunkook M. 
Suh, Measuring Subjective Well-Being To Compare Quality of Life of Cultures, in CULTURE 
AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING l , 3 (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh eds., 2000) ("If societies 
have different sets of values, people in them are likely to consider different criteria relevant 
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people.111 In many of the situations most relevant to WBA, this is 
. 11 . b h 11 2 vutua y certam to e t e case. 
Cost-benefit analysis is equally subject to concerns about 
cardinality. Because of the diminishing marginal value of money, two 
individuals with differing levels of personal wealth can obtain vastly 
different amounts of welfare from the same gain ( or loss) of income.113 
when judging the success of their society."). Empirical studies have found, however, that 
similarly situated individuals in different countries have similar levels of life satisfaction. Betsey 
Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Happiness: Reassessing the Easterlin 
Paradox, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2008, at 1, 67, 69. This suggests that 
subjective well-being measures may even be comparable across countries. If that is the case, 
they will very likely be comparable across regions or communities within a given country. 
111. See Rafael Di Tella & Robert Macculloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in 
Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 25, 29-32 (discussing the possibility of reducing 
systemic differential reporting biases by comparing across larger groups). In addition, the U-
Index proposed by Krueger et al. is designed to mitigate differences in scale usage. See Krueger 
et al. , supra note 83, at 18-20. 
112. For example, whereas different uses of the scale might be an issue when comparing 
surveys conducted in different countries with different languages, it is far less likely to be an 
issue when making local or national regulatory policy. There is no evidence that different 
populations within the United States use the scale differently. After all, why would individuals 
who drive to work in traffic use a hedonic scale differently than the individuals who might be 
asked to pay for public-transit projects? Among other things, in many cases these will be the 
same populations of people. 
Some might contend that circumstances such as disability and unemployment create the 
potential for some degree of scale re-norming. That is, they might argue that ideal happiness 
could mean something different to a person after becoming seriously disabled or unemployed, 
and that the person might report a higher score for the same level of positive feeling than she 
would have reported before she was injured or unemployed. There is no reason to believe this is 
true, but even if it were, techniques like the U -index developed by Alan Krueger, Daniel 
Kahneman, and colleagues avoid the issue of different scale usage by comparing responses only 
within subjects. See Krueger et al. , supra note 83, at 20. The hedonic data are interpreted with 
respect to individuals and converted into externally comparable numbers. Although this 
approach does not encompass all relevant data, it nonetheless constitutes an interpersonally 
cardinal scale. 
In addition, if scale re-norming were taking place, we would expect to see evidence of 
adaptation to all debilitating health conditions. All affected individuals would be altering the 
way that they report their happiness to take into account their changed circumstances. Yet this 
is not what hedonic psychologists have found. Instead, humans appear to exhibit almost 
complete adaptation to some conditions, partial adaptation to others, and zero adaptation to 
others still, including health problems like chronic pain and ringing in the ears. See John 
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the 
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1541 (2008). This is a strong indication 
that scale renorming is not taking place. 
113. See, e.g., Ed Diener & Carol Diener, The Wealth of Nations Revisited: Income and 
Quality of Life, 36 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 275, 279-81 (1995) ("(F]or lower levels of income, 
there is a rapid rise in meeting physical needs as income increases, but for much of the income 
distribution there is a ceiling effect . .. . "); Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public 
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Adjusting CBA in accordance with variations in marginal values of 
money is quite technically complex, and the proper solution is 
frequently unclear or highly context dependent.114 And the problems 
for CBA do not end there. Even two equivalently wealthy individuals 
may have vastly divergent welfare functions-additional wealth might 
benefit one far more than the other. Individuals' welfare functions are 
unobservable;115 economists know ( or assume) that marginal values of 
money are positive and diminish with increasing wealth, but they can 
be sure of little else. 116 Economists typically respond to this problem 
by simply ignoring it117 or by assuming that its effects dissipate across 
large populations118-in precisely the same way that it will for WBA. 
It is thus hard to imagine that interpersonal comparisons will present 
greater difficulty for WBA than they do for classical CBA. 
A second possible obstacle for WBA lies in the ambiguities 
involved in aggregating interpersonal welfare states. For instance, if 
Person A's welfare decreases from 6.0 to 5.0 and the welfare of 
Persons B through Z increases from 6.0 to 6.1, it is difficult to know 
whether this net gain of 1.5 WBUs119 actually indicates that overall 
welfare has increased, decreased, or remained constant.120 
This objection has two components. The first is simply a 
repetition of the interpersonal comparison problem discussed above: 
it is impossible to know whether a hedonic improvement for Person B 
from 6.0 to 6.1 is of equivalent magnitude to a hedonic regression for 
Person A from 6.0 to 5.9. We have already addressed this question. 
The second component is the argument that, when a project leaves 
Good, 107 ECON. J . 1832, 1834-35 (1997) (discussing variation in the significance of income's 
role in satisfaction across income levels). 
114. See JAMES C. MCDAVID & LAURA R. L. HAWTHORN, PROGRAM EVALUATION & 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRACTICE 265--&i (2006); see also 
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 142-46; Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 177-81 
(illustrating the difficulty of forward-looking CBA under income effects). 
115. See PER-OLOV JOHANSSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS 
40 (1991); ROBERT L. NADEAU, THE WEALTH OF NATURE 115-16 (2003). 
116. Uncertainty concerning individual welfare functions is especially problematic when 
attempting to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, which are likely possible in only 
limited circumstances. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. E CON. 309, 315-19 (1955). 
117. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 193. 
118. See, e.g., id. at 181-87; Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 111, at 29. 
119. Twenty-five people have each gained 0.1, for a total gain of 2.5, and 1 person has lost 
1.0, for a net of 1.5. 
120. See Adler & Posner, supra note 109, at S281. 
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some people better off and others worse off, a weak welfarist121 
cannot conclude that it is worth pursuing merely because overall 
welfare has increased. This claim is certainly correct, but it is again 
identical to the problems faced by CBA or any other wealth-based 
decision procedure. The simple fact that a project will result in Person 
A receiving $100 and Person B losing $50 is not sufficient reason to 
undertake the project in light of distributional issues and other 
considerations beyond aggregate welfare.122 This is merely another 
way of stating that there is no independent moral or normative 
significance to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.123 The fact that Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency is not morally decisive is by now a well-accepted conclusion 
among even CBA's most sophisticated defenders.124 
The final important objection to WBA focuses on hedonic 
compensations for prior events-when someone is compensated 
during Period 2 for a decrease in welfare that occurred during Period 
1. Imagine that an individual has been injured in a car accident, 
causing her average moment-by-moment well-being to fall from 6.0 to 
5.0 for a period of one year (after which time it returns to 6.0).125 
Imagine that there were two potential methods of compensating her 
for her injury: Plan A would raise her well-being from 6.0 to 7.0 for 
one year, and Plan B would raise her well-being from 6.0 to 6.5 for 
two years. A critic might argue that it is unclear whether either of 
121. As we discussed in Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, we are weak 
welfarists in the following sense: we contend that increasing aggregate welfare is desirable all 
else being equal, but we make no claims regarding the relative value of welfare vis-a-vis other 
possible values such as the distribution of welfare or welfare-unrelated moral concerns. 
122. This is true if Person A and Person B have different welfare functions, such that the 
project might diminish overall welfare-again, the problem we address in Part IV.B.2-but it is 
also true even if they have identical welfare functions and aggregate welfare will increase. 
123. A Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome is one in which the parties that benefit from a 
project "could fully compensate those who stand to lose from it and still be better off." Amy 
Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1415 (2005). Or, put another way, a project is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it 
would be possible to make a transfer of wealth that would leave all parties better off than before 
the project was implemented. ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN, DA YID H. GREENBERG, AIDAN R. 
VINING & DA YID L. WEIMER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 32 (1996). 
124. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 22 ("Because Kaldor-Hicks is, taken as a 
moral principle, unsound, CBA cannot be justified by reference to Kaldor-Hicks."); Adler & 
Posner, supra note 13, at 195. But see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the 
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491-97 (1980) 
(attempting to justify Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a moral criterion); Richard A. Posner, 
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory , 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1979) (same). 
125. As with the preceding Subsections, we draw this hypothetical (and this objection) from 
Adler & Posner, supra note 109, at S281. 
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these plans would compensate her appropriately. Depending on the 
relationship between her survey responses and her actual well-being, 
and on how she values the well-being of each of her various temporal 
selves, either Plan A or Plan B might over- or undercompensate her. 
Upon examination it becomes evident that this objection again 
reduces to a combination of two arguments, one of which we have 
already addressed. The issue of whether a decline from 6.0 to 5.0 is of 
equivalent magnitude to an improvement from 6.0 to 7.0 (or twice 
that of an improvement from 6.0 to 6.5) is merely an intrapersonal 
variant on the quandary regarding interpersonal comparisons and the 
shape of hedonic curves. 126 We have already dealt with this question 
and shown that it is, if anything, more easily handled than the parallel 
problems surrounding CBA. On the other hand, the intertemporal 
problem-whether a gain in Period 2 effectively counterbalances a 
loss in Period 1-is simply an intrapersonal variant of a broader 
question of interpersonal aggregation. That is, if a project increases 
overall welfare, is that a sufficient condition for it to be worth 
pursuing, even if it decreases the welfare for some individuals? This is 
a difficult moral question, and one that we do not attempt to answer 
here. There may be many instances in which a project is welfare 
increasing but, for distributional reasons, should not be undertaken. 
Well-being analysis is not meant as an answer to distributional 
concerns, though of course it could be used to provide information 
relevant to those concerns. 
To facilitate the comparison with cost-benefit analysis, we will 
proceed here as if the primary governmental objective were to 
increase aggregate well-being.121 This parallels the principal goal 
underlying cost-benefit analysis. Accordingly, in the Sections that 
follow we describe a regulation or project as "well-being justified" or 
"welfare justified" if it would increase the overall aggregate welfare 
of the population. 
5. Deliberate Manipulation of Well-Being Data. Technical and 
theoretical problems with well-being data aside, it is also possible that 
individuals or groups would seek to manipulate well-being data in 
order to accomplish various policy objectives. After all, it is nearly 
126. See supra Part 11.B.4. 
127. This is by no means the only conceivable welfarist governmental objective, as we 
explained in detail in prior work. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1632-
34. 
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costless for an individual to answer untruthfully in response to a well-
being survey. An individual who hoped to affect future policy 
decisions could shade her response in order to make similar policy 
choices appear more or less beneficial. For instance, suppose that 
social conservatives in Washington State, where same-sex marriage 
became legal in December 2012,128 wished to prevent it from being 
legalized in other states as well. They might begin registering 
extremely low levels of subjective well-being in the wake of the 
legalization in order to make it appear to policymakers as if the law 
has harmed overall well-being in the state. 
This is a serious concern, but there are a number of potential 
policy correctives. First, policymakers would ideally be collecting 
well-being data on an ongoing (longitudinal) basis in order to 
facilitate analysis of policy changes. This means that an individual in 
Washington would be completing the same well-being survey after 
the legalization of same-sex marriage that she was completing before 
same-sex marriage was ever placed on the agenda. This would reduce 
the salience of any given policy issue to survey respondents. 
In addition, respondents would not know what policy issue their 
responses would be used to analyze. Policymakers might use a given 
set of responses to gauge the effects of same-sex marriage, or they 
might use them to estimate the effects of a park being built across the 
street or the installation of a new light-rail line. An individual who 
reported artificially low ( or high) well-being in an effort to hamper 
( or promote) one type of project or regulation might well end up 
influencing another instead. 
Finally, policymakers could employ the same types of algorithms 
that online reputation regimes (such as Zagat or eBay) use to detect 
deliberately malicious feedback. 129 These algorithms typically screen 
for outliers-reports that are highly inconsistent with the vast 
majority of other feedback on the same firm or individual. 130 Here, 
policymakers could conceivably use algorithms that screen out data 
that are inconsistent with an individual's other self-reports with no 
128. See Laura L. Myers, Same-Sex Couples Wed in Washington State for First Time, 
REUTERS, Dec. 9, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/09/us-usa-
gaymarriage-idUSBRE8B801S20121209. We thank Lior Strahilevitz for raising this point and 
suggesting this issue. 
129. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How 's My Driving?" for Everyone (and Everything?) , 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1732-37 (2006) (suggesting that similar algorithms could screen malicious 
feedback in "How's My Driving" programs). 
130. Id. at 1733. 
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discernible basis for the inconsistency. In some cases this might mean 
throwing out useful information, but such screening algorithms have 
nevertheless proven to be accuracy enhancing in other contexts. 131 
More generally, online reputation regimes have remained fairly 
reliable despite the strong incentives of particular individuals and 
firms to spread misinformation. 132 It is unlikely that well-being surveys 
will fare worse. 
Moreover, CBA is hardly immune from this type of problem. An 
individual who responds to a contingent valuation survey has no 
incentive to provide an accurate response.133 Thus, for instance, the 
same social conservative might offer an artificially high answer when 
asked how much she would be willing to pay to keep same-sex 
marriage illegal. Similarly, an environmentally conscious individual 
might provide an artificially high answer when asked how much she 
would pay for cleaner skies. Sophisticated social scientists have 
attempted to devise correctives to this issue, but it is impossible to 
eliminate the problem entirely.134 
These types of problems are, if anything, more significant for 
contingent valuation surveys than they are for well-being surveys. The 
reason is that a contingent valuation survey necessarily highlights and 
makes salient the policy choice in question-the individual is asked 
how much she would pay for some policy outcome-which makes it 
easier for an individual to provide a deliberately misleading answer. 
The question at issue is not obscured, as it is within well-being 
surveys. We will discuss contingent valuation surveys in much greater 
depth in Part III. For the moment it suffices to note that the types of 
highly charged political issues that might cause individuals to 
manipulate well-being surveys would also cause them to manipulate 
contingent valuation surveys, possibly to greater effect. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. at 1734 n.145 ("Collusive ratings are a problem for online feedback systems 
generally, though eBay has been able to keep this problem at tolerable (albeit nonzero) levels to 
date."). 
133. See Richard T. Carson & W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent Valuation, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 821,883 (Karl-Gran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent 
eds. , 2005) ("[P]eople only try to tell the truth when it is in their economic interest to do so."). 
Well-conducted contingent valuation studies attempt to control for these issues, but doing so is 
difficult. See John C. Whitehead & Glenn C. Blomquist, Benefit-Cost Analysis, in HANDBOOK 
ON CONTINGENT VALUATION 92, 103--04 (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 2006). 
134. See Carson & Hanemann, supra note 133, at 883 (explaining that respondents' 
incentives to prevaricate "make[] the design of CV [contingent valuation] survey questions and 
their analysis much more challenging"). 
2013] WBA vs. CBA 1633 
C. Well-Being Analysis: An Example 
How feasible is well-being analysis, and how would it differ from 
cost-benefit analysis? To answer those questions, in this Section we 
take an actual cost-benefit analysis conducted as part of an EPA 
regulation and recalculate the costs and benefits of the regulation 
usingWBA. 
This exercise actually stacks the deck overwhelmingly in favor of 
CBA and against WBA. The actual CBA used here was the product 
of decades of opportunities to refine CBA, and countless millions of 
dollars spent on studying these phenomena and performing these 
analyses. 135 By contrast, this Section constitutes the first WBA that 
has ever been conducted. There has never been any systematic 
collection of well-being data related to any government project, much 
less the regulation we analyze here. 
For that reason, our analysis falls far short of the level of 
accuracy that could be achieved were WBA to be adopted in practice. 
Nonetheless, and strikingly, the WBA sketch we provide yields 
results that are likely to be no less reliable than those of the cost-
benefit analysis that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
itself conducted. This demonstrates the inherent advantages of WBA, 
the ease with which it could immediately be implemented, and the 
potential for truly impressive results if it were conducted with the 
resources currently available to CBA. 
l. EPA Regulation of Pulp and Paper Production: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis.136 The regulation we examine was promulgated by the EPA 
under the Clean Water Act137 in 1998 to curb toxic effluents from pulp 
and paper mills. 138 Prior to 1998, pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 
135. See generally Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Comment, Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A 
Question (and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135 (2008) 
(providing a general history of cost-benefit analysis). 
136. Although our examples in the Introduction and Parts I and II have focused on clean-air 
and clean-water regulations for the sake of clarity and consistency, everything we say in this 
Article applies more generally to all regulations. We broaden our pool of examples in Parts III, 
IV, and V. 
137. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
138. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp 
and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New 
Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504 
(Apr. 15, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261 & 430). The regulation, 40 C.F.R. pt. 430, was 
upheld by the D.C. Circuit. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2002). One 
of us has written about this regulation before. Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 680-87; 
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used a number of chlorine-based chemicals m the normal 
manufacturing process. Dioxin and furan, two carcinogens, are among 
the byproducts that result from producing paper and paperboard with 
these chlorine-based chemicals.139 Pulp and paper mills then released 
those chemicals into the waterways in quantities great enough to 
sicken and kill fish and cause a number of diseases, including cancer, 
in humans who ate the fish. 140 
The EPA considered three regulatory options. "Option A" 
required the mills to substitute chlorine dioxide for elemental 
chlorine in the production process, which reduces but does not 
eliminate the discharge of dioxin and furan. 141 "Option B" was a 
stricter rule, combining the Option A limits and a requirement that 
the mills eliminate lignin (a material in wood pulp), along with several 
other restrictions on the manufacturing process. 142 Option B would 
have resulted in even lower emissions of dioxin and furan than 
Option A. Finally, "Option TCF" ("totally chlorine free"), required 
that pulp and paper mills eliminate all chlorine from the production 
process, thereby also eliminating the discharge of furan and dioxin. 143 
The EPA estimated that this regulation would produce several 
different types of benefits. First, there would be fewer cancer deaths 
among recreational and subsistence anglers who consume fish that 
have swum near pulp a1'd paper mills. 144 The EPA refused to specify a 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 
VA. L. REV. 579, 594-95 (2012). The EPA simultaneously regulated airborne emissions from 
pulp and paper mills under the Clean Air Act, 42 U .S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011)), but for ease of explication we limit our examination here to the Clean Water Act 
portion of the regulation. 
139. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp 
and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New 
Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,541-
43. 
140. Id. at 18,565, 18,587. 
141. Id. at 18,542-43. 
142. Id. at 18,541-42. 
143. Id. at 18,542. 
144. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA CONTRACT NO. 68-C3-0302, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
FOR THE NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FOR SOURCE 
CATEGORY: PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTION; EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS G UIDELINES, 
PRETREATMENT STANDARDS, AND NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: PULP, PAPER, 
AND PAPERBOARD CATEGORY-PHASE 1, at 8-12 tbl.8-6 (1997), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/pulppaper/uploacl/1997 _l 1_13_guide_pulppaperjd 
_pulp.pdf (calculating the annual monetized benefits from a reduction in cancer cases). The 
EPA also stated that the regulations would reduce the risk of noncancer illnesses but did not 
report monetary estimates because of inadequate data. Id. at 8-14. In addition, the EPA 
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single monetary value of life, instead announcing that each life saved 
was worth between $2.5 and $9 million.145 However, it is worth noting 
that these figures refer only to the value of the lives lost. The EPA 
did not possess and did not employ data on the cost of being stricken 
with cancer, above and apart from eventual mortality.146 Second, 
reducing the quantity of dioxin released into fisheries would reduce 
the number of "fish consumption advisories," during which fishing 
must cease, and thus increase the number of days that fishing could 
take place.147 Third and finally, pulp and paper mills produce sludge, 
which must be disposed of. Reducing the amount of dioxin and furan 
in the sludge would allow the mills to dispose of the sludge via 
cheaper means. 148 
At the same time, the regulation also imposed significant costs. 
Mills were forced to switch from chlorine-based chemicals to more 
expensive alternatives and to treat their effluents before they were 
released into the waterways.149 Table 1 lists the annual costs and 
benefits, as calculated by the EPA, of all three options the agency 
considered in its regulation of pulp and paper. 
estimated that the regulation would reduce deaths among Native Americans who are 
subsistence anglers. Id. at 8-15 tbl.8-8. It declined, however, to include this benefit within the 
analysis because of uncertainty in the data. Id. at 4-15 Although this decision is probably 
indefensible, we adhere to it here in the interest of parallelism between our WBA and the 
EPA'sCBA. 
145. Id. at 8-12 tbl.8-6. 
146. We will attempt to approximate this cost-more accurately described as a benefit, 
actually, because these are cancer cases avoided-in the WBA we perform below. See infra Part 
11.C.2. 
147. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY .supra note 144, at 8-23. The EPA also surmised that more 
anglers would elect to fish if toxic effluents were reduced, and it estimated the benefit of this 
increased fishing at $4.7 to $15.5 million per year. Again, however, because of uncertainties in 
the data , the EPA did not end up including these figures in its benefit estimate. Id. at 8-23, 8-24, 
8-26 tbl.8-12. As with the benefits described above, we adhere to the EPA's decision without 
endorsing it. 
148. Id. at 8-24. 
149. See generally id. at 5-1 to 5-29 (discussing costs of implementing the rule) . 
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Table 1: Annual Costs and Benefits, EPA Pulp and Paper Regulation 
(in millions of 1995 dollars}1 50 
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'.\kdia11 net 
hL·ndits 
( >ptiun A _____ Option B __ Option TCF 
-262 -324 -1081 
8-16 8-16 8-16 
2.1-19.4 2.1-19.4 2.1-19.4 
1.8-21.7 1.9-22.5 2.0-25.2 
-250.9- -312.0- -1,084.4 -
-205.7 -266.1 -1,035.9 
-228.3 -289 -542.5 
As Table 1 makes clear, none of the options is cost-benefit 
justified according to standard CBA methodologies. The EPA 
selected Option A, which appears to do the least harm, yet even 
under that option the costs exceed the benefits by more than $228 
million per year. 151 
In addition, and importantly for our analysis, the EPA calculated 
that the regulation would lead to the loss of significant numbers of 
jobs. The increased regulatory costs would increase pulp and paper 
prices, reducing consumer demand for pulp and paper products. 152 
150. This Table was assembled using data found in id. at 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 8-12 
tbl.8-6, 8-23, 8-25, 8-45, 8-23, 8-26 tbl.8-12. 
151. The EPA calculated that Option A coupled with regulation under the Clean Air Act 
would result in net positive benefits, and so the agency's eventual outcome is cost-benefit 
justified. Id. at 8-27 tbl.8-13. Of course, this begs the question of why the EPA did not simply 
regulate only under the Clean Air Act if it produced substantial net benefits whereas regulation 
under the Clean Water Act produced substantial net costs. 
152. See id. at 6-18 ("Although the mills stay open with a price increase, consumers pay the 
price increase."). 
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This reduction in demand would force mills to lay off workers. 153 As 
pulp and paper production declined, suppliers and affiliated 
industries would also suffer and be forced to lay off workers. 
However, the EPA did not include these lost jobs in its cost-benefit 
analysis. We suspect that this stemmed from a belief, which continues 
to hold sway throughout the regulatory state, that workers will soon 
find alternative employment and the net costs of unemployment will 
be zero.154 This assumption is almost certainly false, and one of us has 
separately criticized the EPA and other regulatory agencies for 
refusing to include the costs of unemployment in their cost-benefit 
analyses. 155 
We calculate, in Table 2, a revised cost-benefit analysis that 
includes unemployment costs. (The welfare costs of unemployment 
will also figure prominently in the WBA that follows.) For ease of 
explication, we list the compliance costs from Table 1 separately but 
combine the median figures for the three types of benefits ( cheaper 
sludge disposal, elimination of fishing advisories, and lives saved) into 
one row, which we label "Median total benefits." It is worth noting 
that the EPA did not estimate the total unemployment that would 
result under Option TCF, though it did estimate the number of jobs 
that would be eliminated under that Option due to pulp and paper 
mill closures alone.156 Based upon those numbers, which we provide 
below, the job loss from Option TCF would have likely been quite 
substantial. 
153. See id. at 6-19 tbl.6-6 (summarizing impact on employment). 
154. See Masur & Posner, supra note 138, at 582. 
155. Id. at 580-81. 
156. U .S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 6-44 tlb. 6-19. 
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Table 2: Annual Costs and Benefits, EPA Pulp and Paper Regulation, 
Including Unemployment Costs (in millions of 1995 dollars/57 
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900 7100 
5711 NIA 
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-307.8 NIA 
What should be immediately evident from Table 2 is that 
regulatory-compliance costs-principally the costs of shifting to 
nonchlorinated chemicals-dominate even this revised cost-benefit 
analysis. Even for Option A, the least costly regulatory option, these 
compliance costs are nearly ten times greater than the total estimated 
benefits and more than twenty times greater than the costs related to 
unemployment. It is not atypical for compliance costs to dominate the 
157. This Table was assembled using data found in id. at 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 6-15 
tbl.6-4, 6-34 tbl.6-14, 6-44 tbl.6-19. 
158. This figure is based upon an estimated yearly cost of $3300 per unemployed worker. 
See Masur & Posner, supra note 138, at 618 ("A conservative estimate is that an average worker 
who loses his job in a mass layoff will suffer earnings losses of more than $100,000 over the rest 
of his life . . . . "). 
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cost side of the ledger in cost-benefit analysis. Industrial costs can be 
very steep and easily monetized, and so they can dwarf other inputs 
to the CBA. In addition, a glance back at Table 1 reveals that the 
monetized benefits of reducing deaths from cancer are quite modest 
when compared with the other benefits that the regulation will 
provide. The monetized benefits from cheaper sludge removal and 
fewer fishing advisories, in combination, exceed the benefits from 
reducing the number of deaths from cancer. These are both 
remarkable findings, and they shed light on the (possibly distorting) 
effects of monetizing costs and benefits. What remains to be seen is 
whether they are indicative of the true welfare effects of the 
regulation. That is a question we address in the following Subsection. 
2. The EPA 's Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Well-Being Analysis. In 
this Subsection we reengineer the EPA's cost-benefit analysis as a 
well-being analysis. To do so, we convert the costs and benefits of the 
regulation into well-being units. Wherever possible, we make this 
conversion directly. That is, we translate the benefits of reduced 
cancer deaths directly to WBUs, rather than adopting the EPA's 
pricing of those lives and then converting the dollars into WBUs. 159 
All calculations are based on a well-being scale that runs from 0.0 to 
10.0. What follows is a summary of the conversion of each of the costs 
and benefits involved. 
a. Compliance Costs, Sludge Disposal, and Fewer Fishing 
Advisories. Compliance costs and the benefits of cheaper sludge 
disposal are both entirely monetary. Ideally we would measure the 
welfare value of fewer fishing advisories by estimating the hedonic 
value of fishing and multiplying it by the additional hours that anglers 
will be able to spend engaged in that activity. However, to our 
knowledge hedonic data on fishing does not yet exist. Accordingly, 
we use the EPA's monetary estimate of this benefit. We sum these 
three quantities to determine the aggregate monetary cost of the 
regulation. 
The next question is how to translate that monetary cost into 
WBUs. These expenditures will have an effect on well-being only to 
the extent that they are paid for and felt by individuals. Some of the 
159. We do not apply a discount rate in this WBA because it is uncertain whether 
discounting would be appropriate in WBA. See infra Part V. As we explain in Part V, this is a 
potential strength of WBA, rather than a weakness. If further research reveals that discounting 
is appropriate, it would be straightforward to discount costs and benefits accordingly. 
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benefits will accrue to the anglers who are able to fish with fewer 
interruptions. Compliance costs and sludge-related benefits will be 
borne by some combination of consumers of pulp and paper and 
shareholders in pulp and paper companies. (The exact division 
depends on the extent to which pulp and paper firms are able to pass 
their costs along to consumers.) 
It is impossible to know precisely how many households will 
share these costs, though nearly every household consumes paper to 
some degree. For purposes of this analysis we assume that the 
monetary costs and benefits will be equally borne by one million 
Americans.160 Each individual will bear several hundred dollars in net 
monetary costs, depending upon the regulatory option. We also 
assume that each individual earns the median household income, 
which in 1998 was $38,885.161 
What effect will these monetary costs have on welfare? Studies 
have found that life satisfaction increases logarithmically with 
income. We use the results of one of the largest and most recent of 
these studies, which found that an approximately threefold increase in 
income was associated with a 0.11 increase in WBUs.162 (Similarly, a 
two-thirds decrease was associated with a 0.11 decrease in WBUs.)163 
That is, an individual whose income increased from $100,000 per year 
to $272,000 per year would gain 0.11 WBUs per year. If that same 
individual's income decreased from $100,000 to $36,700, she would 
lose 0.11 WBUs. The total gain or loss is given by the following 
formula: 
160. Because the total dollar cost is a constant number, our analysis is largely unaffected by 
whether that total cost is spread across virtually everyone who consumes paper products (say, 
200 million Americans) or a much smaller subset (say, 1 million). The only difference is that if 
the total is borne by a smaller subset rather than spread across everyone, then each person 
affected must pay a higher amount. That results in a larger effect of cost on well-being, given 
that money affects welfare in a logarithmic rather than linear fashion. See infra note 162 and 
accompanying text. We anticipate that our analysis may be criticized for placing too little weight 
on the value of money, so we choose the smaller number of 1 million (as opposed to, say, 200 
million or everyone) purely to make the most conservative possible assumption. That is, we 
accentuate the welfare effects of lost income, and those effects are still small. Our calculation on 
this point should thus be considered an upper bound on the welfare effect of monetary costs for 
a regulation of this type. 
161. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES, at v (1998), available 
at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-206.pdf. 
162. Nattavudh Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different Price Tags on the 
Same Health Condition: Re-evaluating the Well-Being Valuation Approach, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 
1032, 1038 tbl.3 (2011) . 
163. Id. 
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(1) Welfare loss due to income decline 
= 0.11 WBUs x (ln (new income)- ln (old income)) 
We apply this formula to the income loss caused by the net costs of 
EPA's regulation in Table 3, below. 
b. Cancer Cases A voided. The EPA provided a range of 
estimates for the number of cases of cancer that will be avoided under 
each regulatory option. In the interest of simplicity, we base our 
calculations on the median number. There are limited available data 
on the welfare loss that an individual experiences when she is sick 
with cancer, but one study calculated the welfare loss from 
"stomach/liver/kidneys or digestive problems," which we believe is 
the closest analog.164 That welfare loss is 0.238 WBUs per year while 
the person is sick. 165 We assume that the typical individual who dies 
from cancer caused by dioxin and furan effluents is sick with cancer 
for two years and then dies thirty years before she normally would.166 
This is obviously a rough assumption, but it is no rougher than the 
EPA's assumption that all lives are equivalently valuable and have a 
median value of $5.75 million. 167 The average American has a life 
satisfaction of 7.4 (again, on a scale of 0.0 to 10.0).168 When an 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. To arrive at this number, we begin by noting that the average American lifespan is 78 
years. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (2012). If 
anglers were evenly distributed across age categories, then the average angler would be 39 years 
old, meaning that saving such a person from death would save them nearly 40 years of life. In 
recognition that our well-being numbers may be criticized for valuing life much more heavily 
than does CBA, we "round down" to make a very conservative estimate of 30 years. 
167. See infra Parts III.A.I, IV.B. 
168. See Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 182 tbl.1 
(1996). Studies have shown that older individuals are typically happier than younger and 
middle-aged people. Yang Yang, Social Inequalities in Happiness in the United States, 1972 to 
2004: An Age-Period Cohort Analysis, 73 AM. Soc. REV. 204, 213 (2008). Individuals who do 
not become sick and die from cancer as a result of this regulation will be adding years to the end 
of their lives, when they are happiest. Accordingly, by using the average American life 
satisfaction figure we will tend to underestimate slightly the benefits of avoiding cancer. 
One potential problem from using these data is that individuals might not assign a 
value of O to death or nonexistence when using a hedonic scale that runs from O to 10. Some 
individuals might use 0, the bottom end of the scale, to indicate states that are worse than 
nonexistence, such as intense pain. If that is the case, then death or nonexistence might register 
as some small, non-zero number. Our concerns may be entirely unwarranted, and even if they 
were to prove accurate they would have little impact on the WBA we perform. Nonetheless, it is 
for this reason that we generally advocate using a scale that runs from -10 to 10. See supra Part 
II.A. 
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individual dies, she loses all of the welfare that she might otherwise 
have experienced throughout the remaining years of her life. 169 Thus, 
we calculate the welfare benefit from avoiding one fatal case of 
cancer by the following equation: 
(2) Welfare benefit from avoided fatal cancer 
= 2 x (0.238 WBUs) + 30 x (7.4 WBUs) = 222.48 WBUs 
c. Unemployment. Unemployment is one condition about which 
there exists substantial hedonic data. Studies indicate that 
unemployment has a significant impact on well-being. 110 Unemployed 
individuals suffer a loss of 0.83 WBUs per year during the time that 
they remain unemployed. 111 Even after finding new employment, 
these same individuals lose an average of 0.34 WBUs per year during 
the next seven years after they begin working again. 172 
For purposes of this WBA, we assume that the average person 
who becomes unemployed as a result of this regulation is out of work 
for six months. This corresponds roughly to the median duration of 
unemployment in the years 2011 and 2012.173 Each unemployed 
individual thus loses 0.83 x 0.5 = 0.415 WBUs during the period of 
unemployment. In addition, she loses 0.34 WBUs per year for the 
169. We do not include any benefits to the family or friends of individuals who do not 
develop cancer because CBA typically does not include these third-party benefits. See Sean 
Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. ON REG., 101, 103 (2013). 
170. Richard E. Lucas, Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being: Does 
Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 75, 77 
(2007); Lucas et al. , supra note 66, at 11. 
171. See Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11. 
172. See Lucas, supra note 170, at 77; Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11. Lucas and his 
coauthors do not have data past the 7-year mark (nor does anyone else), and we are reluctant to 
speculate as to what future studies might reveal. Four German scholars have also recently 
conducted an excellent study of the effect of current (but not past) unemployment on moment-
by-moment happiness. Andreas Knabe, Steffen Ratzel, Ronni Schob & Joachim Weimann, 
Dissatisfied with Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed 2 
(CESifo Working Paper No. 2604, 2009), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ 
ces/ceswps/_2604.html. This is precisely the sort of data that we hope policymakers will collect in 
the service of analyzing regulations via WBA. We do not incorporate this study in our analysis 
because all of our other data comes from life satisfaction studies, and it would complicate the 
analysis substantially if we were to attempt to combine these different types of data. 
173. See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA: ANNUAL 
AVERAGES, at tbl.30 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2012.pdf (showing that the 
median duration of unemployment for full-time workers was 24.1 weeks in 2011 and 21.8 weeks 
in 2012). 
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seven years following reemployment, for a total of 0.34 x 7 .0 = 2.38 
WBUs. 
The EPA's CBA presents only yearly costs and benefits, not 
total costs and benefits. The agency annualized all costs over a 30-
year period.174 However, the agency calculated total (as opposed to 
yearly) unemployment. Accordingly, we divide the hedonic costs of 
being unemployed by 30 to obtain the yearly costs, similarly 
annualized over a 30-year period. The hedonic effect of the 
unemployment caused by the EPA's pulp and paper regulation is 
given by the following equation: 
(3) Welfare cost of unemployment per job lost 
= (-0.83 x 0.5 -0.34 x 7.0)/30 = -0.093 WBUs 
We are now prepared to aggregate the welfare effects of the 
various costs and benefits. Table 3 presents the WBA of the EPA's 
regulation. 
174. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 4-23. 
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Table 3: Well-Being Analysis of EPA 's Pulp and Paper Regulation115 
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This WBA diverges from the EP A's CBA in two particularly 
notable respects. First, Option A now appears welfare justified: it will 
increase overall well-being in the net. Option B is still not welfare 
justified, but it appears less egregiously harmful than it did through 
the lens of cost-benefit analysis. The EPA may well have been correct 
to choose Option A (rather than not regulating at all), contrary to 
what CBA would indicate. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
the monetary costs of the regulation, which dominated the CBA, are 
nearly irrelevant here. Instead, the benefits of saving lives and the 
costs of unemployment produce the dominant welfare effects. This 
175. This Table was assembled using data found at National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, 
Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,588, 18,591 (Apr. 15, 1998) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261 & 430); and U.S. ENYTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 6-34 tbl.6-
14, 8-45. 
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may appear surprising to scholars steeped in cost-benefit analysis, but 
it is entirely consistent with reams of evidence demonstrating that 
changes in wealth and income have extremely small impacts on 
individual well-being. 116 
This is not to say that policymakers should begin ignoring the 
effects of their regulations on wealth. As we explain in Part 111.D, 
regulations that increase welfare at the expense of vast amounts of 
wealth might eventually become self-defeating and eliminate future 
opportunities for welfare gains. This is why we would not rule out 
preserving CBA as a complement to WBA. But the WBA we 
perform here makes clear the distortions introduced by CBA's focus 
on wealth and monetization. Regulations that do not appear cost-
benefit justified might in fact be found to greatly enhance welfare 
once that welfare is measured more directly. 
Of course, we present here only a back-of-the-envelope sketch of 
a WBA. Our conclusion that the EP A's pulp and paper regulation 
was welfare-enhancing is necessarily tentative and dependent upon 
our assumptions, which may be incorrect. But this exercise should 
demonstrate the feasibility of WBA as a workable decision tool. It is 
possible to conduct a full-scale WBA of a major regulation using only 
the scattered data currently available. With sustained effort and 
attention on the part of the regulatory state, WBA could 
revolutionize the accuracy with which prospective laws are evaluated. 
Ill. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND WELL-BEING 
To translate costs and benefits into dollars, cost-benefit analysis 
relies upon measures of how much individuals are willing to pay to 
acquire benefits or avoid harms.177 These so-called "willingness to 
176. For a review of the extensive literature, see Ed Diener & Robert Biswas-Diener, Will 
Money Increase Subjective Well-being? A Literature Review and Guide to Needed Research, 57 
SOC. INDICATORS REs.119, 120-51 (2002). These findings are also congruent with the emphasis 
that advocates of feasibility analysis have long placed on job loss, as opposed to other types of 
monetary costs. See, e.g., David Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2005). 
177. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945 
(2000) ("In mainstream cost-benefit analysis, the primary work of valuation is done by the use 
of willingness to pay."). Some cost-benefit studies instead examine subjects' willingness to 
accept money in exchange for sacrificing a benefit or bearing a cost. These willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) measures often yield different results than do WTP measures, but the methodologies 
used to determine them are effectively identical, and the problems that affect WTP similarly 
plague WT A. See generally John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of 
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pay" (WTP) measures are determined in two types of ways. In some 
cases, economists attempt to measure individual valuations through 
studies of revealed preferences-studies that demonstrate how much 
individuals are implicitly willing to pay to gain some benefit or willing 
to accept to bear some harm. 178 For instance, some studies center on 
the wage premium for workers who take dangerous jobs: they 
examine how much more a firm must pay a worker to accept a job 
that carries some type of risk, thus revealing the price a worker would 
put on avoiding that risk. 179 Sometimes, however, cost-benefit analysis 
must place prices on costs or benefits that are not traded in a robust · 
marketplace, such as clean air. 180 In these cases, in which revealed 
preferences are unavailable, economists rely upon surveys that ask 
respondents hypothetically how much they would be willing to pay to 
procure a particular benefit or eliminate a particular harm. These 
surveys are known as stated-preference (in contrast to revealed 
preference) or contingent valuation studies.181 
Both revealed preference studies and contingent valuation 
studies are fraught with difficulties and error. These difficulties have 
led to challenging theoretical and methodological disputes among 
CBA's proponents, and they are widely cited as undermining the 
validity and reliability of cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, cost-
benefit analysis continues to rely upon them because it is believed 
that there is no viable alternative. Yet well-being analysis, if 
WT AIWTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002). Accordingly, we use WTP here as 
shorthand to mean WTP or WT A. 
178. Richard H . Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 76 (1995) (" [P]eople reveal the values they attach to various goods through their actual 
behavior in market or market-like settings. If we attend to the choices people actually make, we 
will be able to infer from them the valuations assigned to various goods."). 
179. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUS!, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 46--47 (1998) ("[R]isky jobs must be 
attractive in some other way, such as higher pay, for workers to be willing to bear the risk."). 
180. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2002) ("Since there are no natural 
prices for a healthy environment, cost-benefit analysis requires the creation of artificial ones."); 
Miriam Montesinos, Comment, It May Be Silly, but It 's an Answer: The Need To Accept 
Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 26 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 48, 49-50 (1999) ("The problem with placing values on natural resources is that natural 
resources are not market commodities and therefore do not have market prices."). 
181. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov, Karen E. Jacowitz & Paul Grant, Stated 
Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Psychological Perspective, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 310, 310 
(1993) ("Hundreds of contingent valuations have been carried out in the last two 
decades . . .. "); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 178, at 80 ("Rather than looking at actual choices, 
these methods ask people hypothetical questions about how much they would be willing to pay 
to avoid certain harms or conditions."). 
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conducted properly, could in fact ameliorate or even eliminate many 
of the difficulties endemic to willingness-to-pay measures. The 
Sections that follow describe some of the most important sources of 
error involved in the measurement of willingness to pay and explain 
how well-being analysis could constitute an improvement or 
supplement to the status quo. 
A. Revealed Preferences 
CBA's preferred method for quantifying costs and benefits is to 
examine what actual consumers of a good (such as workplace safety 
or clean air) were willing to pay to acquire that good.182 These 
revealed preference studies are particularly common in the context of 
workplace hazards: there are many studies of the wage premiums 
paid to workers who take dangerous jobs.183 Indeed, CBA prices lives 
primarily by using wage premiums-the amount by which the wages 
of dangerous jobs exceed those of jobs that are safe but otherwise 
comparable. 184 If, for example, a job with an annual death risk of 2 in 
10,000 paid $100 more per year than a comparable job with an annual 
risk of death of 1 in 10,000, that would imply that workers had priced 
their lives at $1 million (10,000 x $100). According to this approach, 
high wage premiums reveal that people value their lives a lot, because 
they need to be paid a lot in order to incur the risk of death. Low 
wage premiums mean the opposite. 
The value of a life is central to CBA in part because so many 
regulations involve trading off some good (such as consumer costs) 
against a risk of death from injury or disease.185 Accordingly, accurate 
calculations of the value of life are absolutely essential to CBA. 186 In 
182. See, e.g., Edna T. Loehman, Sehoon Park & David Boldt, Willingness To Pay for Gains 
and Losses in Visibility and Health , 70 LAND ECON. 476, 479-85 (1994) (examinjng how much 
people would pay for improved air quality). 
183. See Viscusi , supra note 47, at 312-13 (noting that the literature on wage-risk trade-offs 
has become the basis for government policy). 
184. See, e.g., id. ("Estimates from the U.S. labor market indicate that a worker currently 
would require an annual wage premjum of $700 to face a fatality risk of 1/10,000 . ... "); see also, 
e.g. , U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 47, at 5-28 (illustrating how the value of a 
statistical life increases as the cancer latency period decreases). 
185. See Revesz, supra note 11, at 943 ("The primary benefit of many important 
environmental statutes, as determined by the dollar value assigned by cost-benefit analysis, is 
the human lives that are saved."). 
186. Id. at 943-44 ("Thus, in determjning whether a particular regulation can be justified on 
cost-benefit grounds, the central questions revolve around the value assigned to the lives that 
would be saved by the program."). 
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addition, revealed preference studies can be used to price other 
goods, such as clean air or a new road or park, by looking at those 
goods' effect on housing prices. 
Yet these revealed preference studies have many potential 
sources of error. The error sources fall loosely into three categories: 
informational and computational problems, wealth effects, and 
affective forecasting difficulties. The first two could conceivably be 
overcome at significant effort and expense; the third is likely 
insuperable. WBA, by contrast, offers a solution to many of the most 
difficult of these problems. 
l. Informational and Computational Problems. Economists favor 
revealed preference studies because they focus on individuals' actual 
economic decisions. 187 However, that means that these studies must 
rely on individuals to make accurate and informed decisions 
regarding their own welfare. Errors in individual decisionmaking will 
lead to errors in the measurement of costs and benefits. The problems 
with this approach are particularly manifest in the context of wage-
premium studies, and they are manifold. 
First, wage-premium studies assume that people are able to 
assimilate a l-in-10,000 risk of death so as to decide whether they 
prefer avoiding that risk or earning extra money. But empirical 
evidence contradicts that assumption.188 In study after study,189 "survey 
respondents display[] an utter inability to modulate their willingness 
to pay for increases in safety according to how much those safety 
187. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 315 
(1989) ("Contingent valuation is controversial, however, because it is entirely hypothetical and 
because it assumes that people respond to the survey as they would to a marketplace 
transaction .. .. Economists are much more comfortable measuring revealed preferences in 
genuine market sales."). 
188. See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1331-37 (2007) 
("Study after study has demonstrated that individuals experience great difficulty, purely as a 
matter of estimation and intuition, when dealing with high-magnitude, low-probability 
threats."). 
189. Young Sook Eom, Pesticide Residue Risk and Food Safety Valuation: A Random Utility 
Approach, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 760, 769 (1994); M.W. Jones-Lee, M. Hammerton & P.R. 
Philips, The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 ECON. J . 49, 65-66 (1985); 
Michael W. Jones-Lee, Graham Loomes & P.R. Philips, Valuing the Prevention of Non-Fatal 
Road Injuries: Contingent Valuation vs. Standard Gambles, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 676, 688 
(1995); C.T. Jordan Lin & J. Walter Milon, Contingent Valuation of Health Risk Reductions for 
Shellfish Products, in VALUING FOOD SAFETY AND NUTRmON 83, 96-97 (J.A. Caswell ed., 
1995); V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value 
of Risk Changes, 95 J. PQL. ECON. 89, 100 tbl.2 (1987). 
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increases actually would diminish the probability of harm." 190 People's 
minds are not designed to differentiate between exceedingly small 
risks and infinitesimally small risks, and when asked to do so 
rationally, they frequently fail. 191 As a result, small differences in pay 
between certain risky jobs and certain safe jobs cannot be attributed 
to a rational demand by workers to be compensated appropriately for 
the risk. 
Second, most wage-premium studies are based on the 
assumption that workers know the actual mortality risk (1 in 10,000, 
for example) of their job.192 There is no reason to believe that this is 
so, and if it is not, then the studies' validity breaks down; one cannot 
rationally demand a specific amount of extra money in return for a 
specific amount of risk if one does not know what the amount of risk 
lS. 
Third, even if people could assimilate these low-probability 
numbers and knew the actual mortality risk of their jobs, they might 
act on such knowledge in ways other than demanding slightly more 
money for those jobs. For example, they might choose to incur the 
cost of being more careful on the job rather than incur the cost of 
taking a safer job that they enjoy less. Such a choice would fulfill 
CBA's dubious assumption of economic rationality while still 
rendering grossly inaccurate the life-value numbers arising from 
CBA. 
Fourth, it may be that 1-in-10,000 risks of death are simply too 
fine-grained for regression analysis to detect. There are countless 
differences between one job and another. Even a careful CBA study 
that identifies a few dozen of those differences has necessarily left out 
scores of smaller ones. The small risk to life, if it is traded off at all by 
workers, could be traded off against these smaller differences rather 
than the larger ones that are visible to econometricians. Indeed, 
CBA's wage premiums seem to fluctuate for reasons independent of 
risk to life. For example, when unions in the trucking industry lost 
190. Masur, supra note 188, at 1335. 
191. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 
61, 73-74 (2002) ("For most of us, most of the time, the relevant differences-between, say, 
1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000--are not pertinent to our decisions, and by experience we are not well 
equipped to take those differences into account."). 
192. See Maureen Cropper, James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing Mortality Risk 
Reductions: Progress and Challenges, 3 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 313, 317 (2011) 
(" [E]stimates of VSL based on hedonic wage equations assume that the measure of job risk 
used by the researcher matches workers' risk perceptions."). 
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some of their capacity to influence management, drivers' wages failed 
to keep pace with those of comparable jobs in other industries. 193 
Developments like that one, which had nothing to do with workers' 
tolerance for risk, resulted in CBA's use of lower wage-premium 
numbers (and thus lower values for life). 194 In theory, one might say 
that a perfect CBA would isolate the value of risk by accounting for 
union power and everything else like it that can affect wages. But this 
has been difficult in practice, and it might be impossible even in 
theory. No two jobs are truly equivalent in every relevant feature 
except their risk to life. And even if there were two such jobs, they 
could not remain equivalent over time, because their wages would be 
affected in different ways by economic developments independent of 
risk. 
In light of these problems, it should not be surprising that wage-
premium studies have produced widely variant values of life. Studies 
using similar methodologies have set the value of a statistical life as 
low as $100,000 and as high as $76,000,000.195 Such large variation in 
the results of the studies casts doubt on their reliability and validity 
and suggests that random noise or unmeasured variables, rather than 
rational risk trade-offs, account for the numbers. 
WBA, by contrast, sidesteps nearly all of these problems. WBA 
does not require that individuals understand the risk of death in the 
193. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 87 ("Average real wages for truck 
drivers declined 30 percent between 1977 and 1995, due to the combination of deregulation and 
the declining power of the Teamsters union .... "); MICHAEL H . BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON 
WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING DEREGULATION 21-22 (2000) ("While 
unions .. . represented about 60% of all truck drivers twenty years ago, today they represent 
less than 25 % of all drivers."). ' 
194. See, e.g. , Janusz R. Mrozek & Laura 0. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life? A 
Meta-Analysis , 21 J . POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 266--70 (2002) (" Restricting the sample of 
workers to 100 percent unionized workers resulted in larger VSL estimates .... "). Some studies 
attempt to control for unionization. See, e.g., W . Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with 
Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 J . ECON. INQUIRY 29, 36 (2004). 
195. Mrozek & Taylor, supra note 194, at 254; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
VALUING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENT AL POLICY: A WHITE PAPER 85 
tbl.4 (2010) , available at http:/ /yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0563-1.pdf/$file/ee-
0563-1.pdf (compiling data from many hedonic wage studies into a table). Another indication of 
the spread of possible results from such studies is a compilation of 37 hedonic wage studies that 
EPA recently assembled. As calculated by the authors, the standard deviation of the values of 
life among those 37 studies was $14.1 million, or approximately twice the value that EPA 
currently places on a statistical life. See id.; see also W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E . Aldy, The Value 
of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World , 27 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5, 19 tbl.2 (2003) (summarizing a series of hedonic wage studies performed over 
the last three decades that identify VSLs ranging from $0.5 million to $20.8 million). 
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workplace, nor must they be able to accurately grasp what it means to 
face a 1-in-100,000 risk. Under WBA, an individual is only required to 
report her current state of well-being accurately, a far simpler 
cognitive task. There is no need to assume that individuals make 
perfectly rational choices under conditions of perfect information. 
The value of an individual life can be measured simply by aggregating 
the positive and negative moments in that life, as reported by the 
individual. 
WBA also eliminates some of the need to perform complicated 
regression analysis in order to compare similarly situated jobs or 
marketplace goods. Here, WBA's advantage lies in the ability to take 
advantage of longitudinal studies. Suppose that an agency is 
attempting to value the cost of a case of emphysema (in terms of pain, 
suffering, and diminution in the quality of life) to analyze a regulation 
that would protect workers from contracting emphysema in the 
workplace. CBA would examine the wages paid to workers in 
industries in which emphysema is a workplace hazard, and then using 
regression analysis, it would attempt to isolate the wage premium that 
is attributable directly to the risk of emphysema. This is an extremely 
difficult endeavor, as we explained. WBA, on the other hand, would 
simply look at the well-being of a given individual before and after she 
contracted emphysema. The post-emphysema loss in well-being 
represents the hedonic cost of the disease, a cost which the agency 
can then weigh against other hedonic costs and benefits. Economis'ts 
have already made use of large sets of social-survey data to conduct 
exactly these types of studies.196 
We hasten to add that this approach will not eliminate the need 
for regression analysis entirely. Other circumstances in the 
individual's life may have changed during the same time period. For 
instance, her disease may have forced her to take a different job, 
reducing her wages. WBA will have to account for these changes as 
well, using regression analysis, but the problem will be much simpler. 
Because the study will involve the same individuals at multiple 
different times, it will not be necessary to control for nearly so many 
variables. That CBA cannot similarly utilize longitudinal studies, and 
must instead rely on how much money a (potentially uninformed) 
individual would pay or accept at a given instant, is just one of its 
methodological shortcomings. 
196. See generally Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 106 (using a longitudinal study to 
determine the hedonic cost of disability). 
1652 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1603 
2. Wealth Effects. It has long been understood that the value an 
individual places on a risk or a benefit will necessarily be affected by 
that individual's wealth.197 A millionaire might think nothing of paying 
$10,000 to breathe slightly cleaner air, but someone who must support 
a family on $25,000 per year will be much more hesitant to make the 
same trade-off. Similarly, wealthy people rarely take high-risk jobs 
because the wage premium is worth less to them and is insufficient to 
compensate them for the risk. The reason is not that the benefit or 
risk involved is greater for the wealthier person (though there may be 
slight differences). Rather, wealth effects are driven by the fact that 
the money is worth less to the wealthy person. 198 Because cost-benefit 
analysis involves translating harms and benefits into dollars, these 
"wealth effects" will affect cost-benefit calculations. 
Wealth effects play a large and undeniable role in wage-premium 
studies, yet CBA cannot fully account for these effects. The fact that 
rich and poor people (who presumably care equally, or at least 
comparably, about staying alive) would be willing to pay vastly 
different amounts to avoid a 1-in-10,000 risk of death illustrates the 
inadequacy of this metric for valuing lives. WBA circumvents these 
issues entirely by valuing lives based on individuals' own assessments 
of their well-being. 
Yet the problem of wealth effects for revealed preference studies 
and CBA is even more general. To demonstrate this, let us abstract 
away from wage studies to more general methods for utilizing 
revealed preferences. In theory, an agency employing CBA could use 
197. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 195, at 36-43 (finding an income elasticity between 0.5 
and 0.6, such that a 10 percent rise in income would increase WTP by 5 to 6 percent); see also 
Thomas Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value 
of Statistical Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions, 40 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 14, 28 (2010) (finding an income elasticity approaching or exceeding 1.0, such 
that a 10 percent rise in income would increase WTP by more than 10 percent); W. Kip Viscusi , 
The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction and Overview, 40 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 1, 7-11 (2010) (summarizing more recent research finding that WTP values are 
more sensitive to income than previously thought). 
198. The reason is the declining marginal value of money. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, The 
Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1599 n.88 (2009) ("Even rights 
denominated in dollars cannot meaningfully be compared to each other without considering 
how people value those dollars. Due to the declining marginal value of money, most people 
value the liberty to spend $100,000 less than 100 times the amount that they value the liberty to 
spend $1000."); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Borders and the Environment, 39 
ENVTL. L. 141, 155 n.64 (2009) ("Of course, richer people lose more money when they miss a 
day of work due to illness than do poor people, but the declining marginal value of money 
means that what they lose may not be as valuable as the smaller in magnitude losses incurred by 
the poorer people. "). 
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housing prices or other data that reflect the benefits and costs of 
living under various conditions in order to put a value on those 
conditions.199 Imagine, for instance, that an agency is attempting to 
put a dollar figure on the cost of having a nearby factory that emits 
noxious fumes. The agency could compare housing prices in locations 
with clean air and locations with noxious fumes and use multivariate 
regression to isolate the effect of the noxious fumes on those prices. 
This represents a particularly advanced method for revealing 
preferences in that the method can encompass circumstances in which 
individuals are not directly exchanging money for a good. 
Now imagine a government project-a waste storage facility, for 
instance-that will create noxious fumes, resulting in a uniform 
decrease in well-being of everyone within range of those fumes, but 
will have overall positive effects more generally. This project can be 
located in a rich area with 500 very wealthy people or a poor area 
with 1000 people. Imagine that the agency is able to determine that 
the 500 wealthy people would be willing to pay $50,000 each to avoid 
having the waste storage facility placed in their neighborhood, 
whereas the poorer people would be willing to pay $10,000 each. 
If the agency that is deciding where to site the project can tax 
and transfer as part of the project, the solution-purely from the 
perspective of welfare economics-is clear. The government should 
locate the project in the poor area and make a compensating transfer 
from the wealthy to the poor. The wealthy people would prefer to 
pay, say, $25,000 per person to avoid having the project located in 
their neighborhood, and that would be enough money to compensate 
the poorer people such that they would prefer to accept the money 
and the facility over receiving neither. If such a transfer were also to 
make the poorer people happier on balance, then both CBA and 
WBA would recommend that the agency pursue that course. 
Suppose, however, that the agency cannot implement the 
transfer and this first-best solution is unavailable. If the agency is 
using CBA based upon actual willingness-to-pay statistics from the 
two areas, it could find that the 500 wealthy people are willing to pay 
more to avoid the noxious fumes (500 x $50,000 = $25 million) than 
the 1000 poor people (1000 x $10,000 = $10 million), purely because 
of wealth effects. It thus might end up locating the project in the poor 
area rather than the wealthy area. But doing so will actually lead to a 
199. See Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1276-80 
(2008) (describing such a methodology and using it to value certain legal changes). 
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greater reduction in welfare than locating the project in the wealthy 
area, simply because there are more people who will be affected by 
the project in the poorer neighborhood. 
By contrast, a decisionmaker employing WBA would pick up on 
the actual welfare effects of these two options and realize that the 
welfare loss will be greater if the project is located in the poor area 
than if it is located in the wealthy area, because it will affect twice the 
number of people in the poor area. It will site the project in the 
wealthier area. An agency using WBA will thus arrive at the second-
best solution; an agency employing CBA will select only the third-
best option.200 
This phenomenon is much more general. Any time a government 
agency must decide between two projects-or two locations for the 
same project-one of which will affect wealthy people and the other 
of which will affect poor people, it risks being led astray by wealth 
effects if it looks at the actual populations of people who will be 
affected. It may be led to believe that the "wealthy" project will have 
a greater effect on welfare than the "poor" project, simply because of 
the impact of wealth on willingness to pay. When the agency cannot 
tax and transfer-and nearly all agencies lack that authority-it will 
err and select the wrong project. WBA, on the other hand, would not 
be confused by wealth effects. WBA does not require that costs and 
benefits be translated into dollars, and so the wealth of the affected 
population cannot confound the analysis. 
CBA could conceivably address the wealth/welfare disconnect by 
applying distributional weights to costs and benefits. For instance, 
CBA might value a dollar of costs or benefits more if it is experienced 
by a poor person and less if it is experienced by a rich individual. The 
greater an individual's wealth, the less a dollar of cost or benefit 
experienced by that person would affect the CBA.201 The main 
problem with this approach is that it is difficult or impossible to 
200. In addition, if the agency chose the second-best solution and located the project in the 
wealthy area, residents of that neighborhood could conceivably bargain with residents of the 
poorer neighborhood to have the project moved in exchange for a side payment. This bargain is 
of course unlikely; transaction costs or legal barriers might prevent it. But it is at least possible. 
No such Coasean bargain is possible if the project is located in the poor neighborhood because 
the poorer people do not have the funds to pay off the wealthier people. 
201. See Matthew D. Adler, Equity by the Numbers: Measuring Poverty, Inequality, and 
Injustice (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (proposing a 
means of attempting to assign equity weights to costs and benefits experienced by populations at 
different levels of wealth). 
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determine what those distributive weights should be; an individual's 
marginal utility of money is essentially unknowable.202 This may be 
part of the reason that CBA has never adopted distributional weights 
of this type. 
3. Affective Forecasting Errors. Some of the problems with CBA 
that we outline in the preceding Sections-informational and 
computational difficulties, and wealth effects-c-eould conceivably be 
cured via enormous expenditures on data collection and the use of 
extremely delicate and sophisticated statistical methods.203 No 
practitioner of CBA has come close to implementing these types of 
solutions, though they remain theoretically possible. 
However, revealed preference studies suffer from an additional 
incurable flaw, one that WBA does not share. The flaw is that they 
rely upon affective forecasting: the prediction of how an individual 
will feel about an event or a condition before it happens. This is an 
activity with which individuals often struggle greatly. Imagine a 
government project that improves air quality in a particular location. 
Suppose that an agency wishes to place a monetary value on this 
cleaner air using housing prices in a revealed preferences study. The 
theory behind using housing prices to measure the value of this 
project is that individuals will pay more to live in the locality once its 
air quality has been improved. In theory, then, home prices in the 
affected area will depend upon how much both current homeowners204 
and prospective purchasers value the improved air quality.205 
Inevitably, these valuations require comparisons between what it is 
like to live in areas with better and worse air qualities. Thus, the 
current homeowner must remember what the air was like before the 
improvement and estimate her welfare loss from returning to such a 
202. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 607,617 (1996) (explaining that there is no way to determine an individual's marginal 
utility of money). 
203. As we have discussed, some of these problems also implicate WBA, though not to the 
same degree. 
204. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation , 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661, 
1666 (1997) (analyzing a hypothetical "suggest(ing] . . . that a (homeowner]'s hopes or 
aspirations influence negotiation analysis and behavior"). 
205. See Paul Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial 
Desegregation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 547 (1999) ("Housing prices are affected by buyers' 
desires for certain amenities, such as air conditioning, a large kitchen or a driveway. Housing 
prices will vary when certain features rise or fall in desirability. Housing prices are also affected 
by whether the location of housing is near desirable or undesirable metropolitan features." 
(footnote omitted)). 
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state, and the prospective homeowner must estimate how valuable 
the improved air will be to her in the future. 
Study after psychological study has shown that both of these 
exercises are fraught with error. Humans are notoriously bad at 
affective forecasting.206 And they have surprising difficulty even 
remembering how they felt about an event or condition long after it 
has passed.207 Although people usually do a good job of anticipating 
the valence of life events-that is, whether they will be good or bad-
they tend to make systematic errors about both the magnitude and 
duration of their affective responses to those events.208 If individuals 
make significant errors when valuing some amenity, then CBA will 
similarly make significant errors when it adopts and incorporates 
those valuations. 
WBA, by contrast, will only require asking people about their 
current well-being. The governmental agency can then compare the 
current well-being of a population that is receiving the benefits of a 
similar regulation with the well-being of that population ( or a similar 
reference population) before the regulation was implemented to 
determine its impact. These findings can then be applied to similar 
situations in other locations. No prospective or retrospective 
judgments are necessary. 
Revealed preference studies in conjunction with wages and 
workplace conditions have precisely the same problem. Imagine a job 
that comes with some undesirable working condition, such as an 
increased risk of contracting emphysema due to airborne chemicals in 
the workplace. A typical wage study would compare the salary 
accompanying this job to the salary accompanying a comparable job 
that lacked the risk of emphysema.20') 
206. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 49, at 131 ("Research on affective forecasting has 
shown that people routinely mispredict how much pleasure or displeasure future events will 
bring and, as a result, sometimes work to bring about events that do not maximize their 
happiness." (emphasis omitted)); see also David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living 
in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 344-45 (1998) (discussing affective forecasting errors). 
207. See Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L. Sherriff, Laura Damschroder, George Loewenstein, & 
Peter A. Ube!, Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings Than 
Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 688, 691 (2006) (describing difficulties with 
remembering affective states). 
208. For Wilson and Gilbert's description of this phenomenon, see supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
209. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of 
Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 977, 1024 (2004) ("WTP/WTA for the risk of death can 
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This approach, like the housing study described above, relies on 
the predictions of employees regarding conditions with which they 
have no experience. The hypothetical employee, asked to choose 
between the safer and riskier workplaces, would have to anticipate 
what it would be like for her to contract emphysema and then put a 
price on the risk of that occurring. This is a significant cognitive 
hurdle. This employee presumably does not already have 
emphysema, and she may not even know anyone who has ever 
contracted emphysema. How, then, could she possibly forecast what it 
will be like? The result is that agencies often exclude such risks from 
cost-benefit analyses, treating them as if they did not exist.210 Studies 
used to determine the value of a statistical life fare little better; how 
can an individual reliably estimate the value of her own life or what it 
would be like to lose it?211 
WBA simply avoids all of these difficulties. Under WBA, 
researchers would ask people with and without emphysema to report 
on their current levels of well-being.212 No prospective forecasts or 
retrospective judgments are necessary; the individual need only 
report her current feelings. Researchers would then compare the 
well-being of people with emphysema to people without it. The 
differential is the hedonic cost of emphysema, which could then be 
plugged directly into a well-being analysis. Because they eliminate 
any possibility of affective forecasting (or memory) errors, these 
contemporaneous self-assessments are likely to be far more accurate 
than the guesses about the future and past that revealed preference 
studies demand. At a practical level, well-being analysis thus offers 
significant advantages over revealed preference studies. 
be inferred from the wage differential between more and less dangerous occupations."); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2268-75 (2002) (explaining how the 
EPA developed its arsenic regulations under the Clinton administration). But cf OFFICE OF 
INFO. & REGULATORY AFF., supra note 26 at 18 n.20 (noting that OSHA developed its rule on 
occupational exposure to hexavalent chromium using a $7 million value of life). 
210. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 10,307 
(Feb. 28, 2006) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918 & 1926 (2012)) (ignoring these 
risks); Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 671 (describing a regulation in which the agency 
ignores certain health costs for lack of data) . 
211. We explain other problems with value-of-life calculations in Part IV. 
212. See, e.g., Powdthavee & van den Berg, supra note 162, at 1034 (providing self-
assessment data related to a variety of ailments). The preferred method for collecting this data 
is to ask the same people for assessments of their own well-being before and after those people 
contract emphysema. Large-scale data collection efforts like the British Household Panel 
Survey make this approach feasible, and Powdthavee and van den Berg rely on those types of 
sources. See id. 
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B. Contingent Valuations 
Revealed preference studies are widely considered the best 
methodology for pricing costs and benefits.213 However, economists 
cannot rely entirely on revealed preference studies because not all 
costs and benefits involve goods that are traded in markets. Absent a 
market that can be used to set the price for a good, cost-benefit 
analysis must turn to contingent valuation studies: survey-based 
hypothetical questions regarding hypothetical payments for 
hypothetical projects.214 For example, imagine that the government is 
considering mandating the installation of improved automobile 
exhaust systems. The primary effect of these systems would be to 
reduce the amount of smog emitted by cars, leading to less smog ( and 
clearer skies) across the country. 
The economic costs of the exhaust systems might be easy to 
measure, but how can an agency determine the value of cleaner skies? 
Individuals do not have opportunities to buy and sell units of clean 
sky for amounts of money. Indeed, government regulation exists in 
part because these sorts of transactions are sufficiently difficult that 
they do not occur.215 An agency might attempt to use a sophisticated 
housing-price study, as described in the previous Section, but those 
types of studies are extremely difficult to implement and have never 
found widespread use in CBA.216 With no markets to scrutinize, and 
with no opportunity to determine WTP by examining revealed 
preferences, agencies are forced instead to employ contingent 
valuation surveys. These surveys simply ask people how much they 
would be willing to pay to receive a benefit (such as cleaner skies) or 
to avoid a harm, with little additional guidance. 
213. See supra note 187. 
214. Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311 , 2315 (2002) ("The valuation 
is 'contingent' because the valuation produced is contingent upon the hypothetical market that 
was contrived. A famous example is the large-scale survey taken in the wake of the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill, which sought to elicit the monetary value citizens around the country placed on 
avoiding another comparable spill."). 
215. See, e.g. , Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis 
When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1117 (2000) ("Textbook CBA, as 
generally understood, directs agencies to translate people 's moral attitudes about the 
environment into CVs for the existence of environmental goods that they do not directly enjoy, 
usually called 'existence value' or 'non use value."'). 
216. See Malani, supra note 199, at 1275 (discussing housing prices as a means of measuring 
"the welfare effect of a Jaw," but noting that " [t]his is, of course, not the standard practice"); 
supra Part III.A.2. 
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To their credit, contingent valuation surveys avoid many of the 
informational and computational problems that plague revealed 
preference studies. Respondents need not know the risk presented 
because it is stated in the contingent valuation survey. There is no 
obvious possibility that they will respond to the risk other than by 
demanding more money, because the surveys do not allow for such 
actions.211 And by asking directly how much a respondent would pay 
to avoid a risk or obtain a benefit, contingent valuation surveys 
eliminate the need for difficult regression analysis. 
Yet despite these advantages, contingent valuation surveys are 
nonetheless riddled with serious, perhaps decisive, flaws. 218 The 
Subsections that follow describe in detail those problems, and the 
corresponding advantages of WBA's methodologies. 
l. Hypothetical Questions. Not surprisingly, the problems with 
contingent valuation surveys center on the fact that they necessarily 
involve hypothetical questions. Subjects are asked to speculate about 
how much they would be willing to pay without having actually to pay 
anything, which renders their speculation less trustworthy.219 Subjects 
are rarely subject to any true budget constraint: they can state freely 
that they would be willing to pay $1 million for cleaner skies without 
worrying about the other projects that would go unfunded as a result 
of such expenditures.220 And if a researcher wishes to impose a budget 
constraint, it is difficult to choose one that is not arbitrary. Subjects 
are frequently asked about topics they may know little or nothing 
about-for instance, how much they would pay to avoid persistent 
construction noise that they have never before experienced.221 This 
implicates all of the insurmountable problems related to affective 
217. See supra Part 111.A.l. 
218. See John M. Heyde, Comment, ls Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble? , 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 331, 343 (1995) (summarizing criticisms of contingent valuation); see also Ackerman & 
Heinzerling, supra note 180, at 1558 (same). 
219. See Cross, supra note 187, at 317 ("Because people have little experience placing 
monetary value on unpriced natural resources, survey results may be hypothetical and 
inaccurate."). 
220. See, e.g. , John E . Calfee & Clifford Winston, The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability 
for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis, 193 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: 
MICROECONOMICS, no. 1, at 142, 143 n.17 (stating that contingent valuation surveys rarely 
involve budget constraints); Cross, supra note 187, at 317. 
221. See Cross, supra note 187, at 316; McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State , supra note 11, at 66 
(" Another frequent criticism of contingent valuation techniques is that they allow value to be 
measured by the uninformed opinions of uneducated individuals who have had no experience in 
valuing the things that are the subject matter of the surveys."). 
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forecasting that we described in the preceding Section.222 When real 
money and real experiences are not at stake, individual statements 
about willingness to pay are simply unreliable. Economists have long 
understood this point.223 But CBA cannot avoid such hypothetical 
surveys because market transactions do not exist for all potential 
costs and benefits. 
These weaknesses in contingent valuation surveys have 
predictably resulted in prices that are all over the map. To take just 
one example: contingent valuation surveys have set the value of a 
statistical life anywhere from $40,000 to $13 million.224 
Other tests of the validity of contingent valuation surveys have 
produced results that similarly fail to inspire confidence. For instance, 
willingness to pay should be proportional to the size of the benefit 
conferred or the risk reduced. That is, if people are willing to pay 
$1000 to eliminate a 1-in-1000 mortality risk, they should be willing to 
pay $5,000 to eliminate a 5-in-1000 risk.225 Yet numerous studies have 
shown that this is not the case; individual willingness to pay does not 
scale proportionately with the size of the risk reduction.226 For 
instance, in one study respondents were only willing to pay 1.6 times 
as much to reduce a 5-in-1000 risk as they were to reduce a l-in-1000 
risk.221 Many contingent valuation studies do not even include this 
type of validity test. In one recent meta-analysis of 40 contingent 
valuation studies, only 50 percent of them incorporated a test for 
validity.228 Of those that did include such a test, only 15 percent of the 
studies "passed" the test, in the sense that WTP was "nearly 
222. See supra Part 111.A.1. 
223. See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: ls Some Number 
Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45, 49 (discussing the recurrent 
problems with contingent valuation surveys and providing an overview of alternative 
explanations for the responses given in willingness-to-pay questions). 
224. U.S. ENVfL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 195, at 82-83. The EPA also compiled 40 
contingent valuation surveys of the value of life. The standard deviation of the value of life 
among those 40 surveys was over $3 million, as calculated by the authors. See id. 
225. See Cropper et al., supra note 192, at 327. 
226. See id. (surveying the literature). 
227. Anna Alberini, Maureen Cropper, Alan Krupnick & Nathalie B. Simon, Does the 
Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? Evidence from the US and Canada, 
48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 769, 782 tbl.6 (2004). 
228. Cropper et al., supra note 192, at 327-28 (citing U.S. ENVfL. PROT. AGENCY, supra 
note 195). 
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proportional to the risk reduction."229 It is hard to put much faith in 
policy made on the basis of studies such as these. 
One of the principal strengths of WBA is that it need not rely 
upon such hypothetical inqumes. Instead, WBA compares 
individuals' contemporaneous levels of happiness before and after an 
actual project is completed and then uses that information to make 
projections regarding future projects. The surveyed individuals need 
not speculate as to how much money they would pay, and they are 
not subject to all of the biases and distortions that asking hypothetical 
questions regarding money might generate. Rather, they are simply 
asked to state their current level of well-being-a question that has 
been demonstrated to produce reliable and valid answers.230 For 
instance, to estimate the value of clean skies, an agency would collect 
data on well-being in a location with clean skies and a location with 
smog-filled skies-or, better yet, in the same location before and after 
it initiates some project that will lead to cleaner skies. By comparing 
well-being figures with and without clean skies, economists could 
measure the welfare benefits of reducing smog. These benefits could 
then be compared with the economic costs. 
Of course, in some cases it may be difficult to isolate the hedonic 
effects of clean skies amidst all of the other confounding variables. 
For instance, the same jurisdiction that has cleaner skies might also 
have lower unemployment rates, which could itself generate greater 
well-being. Agencies will need to employ sophisticated multivariate 
regression analysis, as we describe above in Part 11.231 Yet even when 
regression analysis is necessary, at most it will present practical 
hurdles that can be surmounted with adequate data and analysis. 
However, complicated regression analysis will not always be 
necessary. Agencies will often be able to employ intrapersonal data-
essentially, longitudinal studies-to circumvent many of the problems 
with multivariate regression we described in the previous Section. For 
instance, suppose that an agency wished to evaluate the benefits of a 
project that would reduce commute times by upgrading public-transit 
systems. Rather than relying on erratic contingent valuation 
surveys-or trying to isolate how much people are willing to pay for 
229. Id. at 328. 
230. DIENER ET AL., supra note 73, at 71-73. 
231. See supra Part II; see also Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 80, at S232 (providing an 
example of sophisticated multivariate regression being used to isolate the effect of one factor on 
happiness). 
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shorter commutes by examining housing prices or wages-WBA 
would simply determine the well-being of individuals as they are in 
the process of commuting. It would then compare that number to 
those individuals' well-being when they are engaged in some leisure 
activity-whatever they might have more time for if their commutes 
were shortened. The difference between those two figures, 
aggregated over the total reduction in commuting times, is the welfare 
gain from such a project. The results that WBA will generate are 
likely to be more reliable than those that contingent valuation surveys 
( or revealed preference studies) are currently producing.232 
2. Wealth Effects. Because they involve asking individuals how 
much they would pay for a benefit (or to avoid a cost), contingent 
valuation surveys will suffer from all of the same wealth effects that 
plague revealed preference studies, described in Part 111.A.2. 
Respondents will necessarily filter their responses through the lens of 
their own finances: a wealthy person might think nothing of paying 
$10,000 for cleaner skies, whereas a poorer individual would be highly 
unlikely to suggest such a price. Of course, these prices are decoupled 
to some degree from individual wealth because contingent valuation 
surveys do not actually require respondents to pay anything. But this 
is a disadvantage, not an advantage. Instead of values that are 
distorted somewhat by wealth, contingent valuation surveys produce 
values that are distorted significantly by their hypothetical nature.233 
There are undoubtedly advantages to using average WTP values, 
but even that approach has significant limitations. First, the 
population of people affected by some potential government action 
may not be "average." For instance, imagine a project that would 
produce cleaner skies over Los Angeles. CBA would run into 
significant problems if it attempted to gauge the value of this project 
by surveying all Californians regarding their willingness to pay for 
improved air quality. Many of the surveyed individuals would live in 
areas that already have clean air, and would thus value a project to 
improve air quality less than a typical Angeleno. Consequently, a 
232. As a matter of last recourse, WBA could also ask individuals to predict their well-being 
if they were to receive some benefit or suffer some harm. This would be the contingent 
valuation version of WBA, and as such it would be subject to all of the problems with affective 
forecasting and hypothetical questions we describe here. But at least it would circumvent issues 
related to wealth and the translation of welfare into dollars, see infra Part 111.B.2, and thus even 
this approach might well be superior to standard contingent valuation studies. 
233. See supra Part III.B.l and III.B.2. 
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survey that encompassed all Californians would understate the 
benefits of cleaner skies in Los Angeles in particular. 
Second, average WTP values provide no information as to where 
a potential project should be sited when there are multiple 
possibilities that might affect different populations of people. More 
generally, they are not useful in deciding between similar projects 
that affect different populations. The only workable approach in such 
a situation is to evaluate the actual effect of the project on the 
different groups, a task that cannot be accomplished using average 
WTPvalues. 
As we described in Part 111.A.2, WBA avoids the problems 
caused by wealth effects because it does not require translating costs 
and benefits into dollars. By relying directly on self-evaluations of 
well-being, WBA simply sidesteps the biases and errors that are 
introduced when individuals are asked to price nonmonetary goods. 
To be certain, WBA requires aggregating interpersonal welfare 
states, and there is no guarantee that each individual is reporting her 
welfare identically on any given scale. Yet there is no reason to 
believe that these self-reports will be systematically biased in any 
given direction, and differences should wash out over large sample 
sizes, as we explained above.234 The same cannot be said for wealth 
effects and CBA. 
C. Willingness-To-Pay Measures and WBA: A Summary 
What all of this means is that CBA will have great difficulties in 
pricing costs and benefits via either revealed preference or contingent 
valuation studies.235 This is significant because the pricing of 
nonmonetary goods is essential-even central-to CBA. Nearly every 
governmental regulation or project will produce some nonmonetary 
benefits and costs, and in many cases the nonmonetary benefits 
(reducing risks to life, in particular) form the entire basis for the 
regulation. Accordingly, the difficulties inherent in converting costs 
and benefits to dollars that we describe here will necessarily limit the 
accuracy and usefulness of CBA as a welfarist decision procedure. 
WBA, by contrast, has no such problem. Instead of trying to 
isolate the amount of money that some individual might demand in 
return for accepting a low-probability risk to her life, or might 
234. See supra Part II .B. 
235. CBA's less common alternative for valuing life, contingent valuation surveys, is inferior 
to WBA on grounds that we discuss in Part III.B. 
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hypothetically be willing to pay for some uncertain benefit, WBA 
simply adds up the positive experiences of life that individuals stand 
to lose or gain under a given project. For instance, to evaluate a 
regulation that reduces the risk of death from some workplace-safety 
hazard, WBA would aggregate the positive experiences that would be 
lost if an individual were to die early236 and then multiply that total by 
the odds of early death. After multiplying the resulting number by the 
number of people affected by a proposed regulation, regulators would 
then compare it with whatever diminution in positivity may be 
associated with enacting the regulation ( due to increased consumer 
costs or some other factor). 
To be sure, WBA's process is imperfect in practice. It relies on 
self-reports as proxies for well-being because science has not yet 
provided a perfect hedonimeter.237 Moreover, WBA relies on 
estimates of likely outcomes, and it provides only a window into 
expected human well-being without resolving how to weigh that 
against other potential values. But relying on estimated outcomes is 
as much a feature of CBA or anything else as it is of WBA: no one 
can predict the future with certainty. Similarly, CBA, like WBA, is 
merely a gauge of human welfare that does not resolve or factor in 
welfare-unrelated considerations. The only unique disadvantage of 
WBA is its reliance on self-reports as proxies, but that imperfection is 
outweighed by those of CBA, which uses proxies such as the wage 
premium that are far more removed from actual well-being.238 
D. Wealth and Welfare 
Before we proceed, we must pause to consider an entirely 
separate line of argument that defenders of CBA might offer. The 
argument is that WBA is fundamentally misguided precisely because 
it attempts to measure welfare directly, rather than wealth. In so 
doing, WBA will naturally capture distributional effects: movements 
236. Had the person lived, she would have experienced many moments that were, instead, 
extinguished by her death. WBA would aggregate the expected number and average level of 
positivity of those moments to determine how much positive life experience her early death 
deprived her of. 
237. Cf F .Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION 
OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 98-102 (London, C. Kagan Paul & Co. 1881) 
(hypothesizing about a hedonimeter); Colander, supra note 72, at 216--19 (reviewing 
psychophysic concepts that "dovetail[] with Edgeworth's description of the hypothesized 
hedonimeter"). 
238. Cf Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1630-32, 1636 (comparing CBA 
and WBA using a hypothetical example). 
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of money from wealthier individuals to poorer individuals will 
increase welfare and be judged favorably by WBA, whereas CBA 
would view them as neutral. In the preceding pages we have treated 
this as an advantage of WBA. After all, if the goal is to improve 
welfare, it makes sense to measure welfare. But defenders of CBA 
might instead cast it as a disadvantage. This argument has several 
related strands, which we describe and address in turn. 
We begin with the most fundamental and conceptual critique. 
Some defenders of CBA might argue that it should not be concerned 
with welfare at all, only with consumption and efficiency.239 CBA, by 
using monetary values, will lead to a maximization of aggregate 
wealth and therefore aggregate consumption. If welfare increases 
linearly with consumption, as many economists believe,240 then 
maximizing consumption will maximize welfare as well. If there are 
distributional concerns that implicate welfare, those can be addressed 
subsequently through the tax system. Economists generally believe 
that it is more efficient to allocate resources via taxes and transfers 
than through regulations and new policy proposals.241 Accordingly, 
agencies should concentrate on maximizing aggregate wealth and 
consumption, and welfare and distributional concerns should be left 
to the tax system. If agencies were to switch to a welfarist decision 
procedure such as WBA, they would be measuring the wrong 
quantity. 
Another way of describing this critique of WBA would be to say 
that CBA will lead to outcomes that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient, while 
WBA may not.242 For instance, in the example we used in Part 111.A.2, 
the government could locate the waste dump in the poorer area, and 
then, using the tax system, transfer $25,000 from each of the rich 
individuals to the poorer individuals, leaving each better off than 
before the project was begun. 
239. We thank David Weisbach for suggesting this point to us. This is contrary to many of 
the most sophisticated modem defenders of CBA, who describe it as a welfarist "decision 
procedure." See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 194. 
240. See, e.g., David Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 47, 90 n.90 (stating the common assumption that welfare is quasi-linear in 
consumption, or linear with respect to all goods other than medical care). 
241. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient 
Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that the 
tax system is more efficient at redistributing wealth than are legal rules such as agency 
regulations). 
242. See, e.g., BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 32; E .J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 390 (1976). For a definition of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see supra note 123. 
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We believe that this critique is misguided for a number of 
reasons. First of all, even if it is true that welfare does not increase 
linearly with consumption, there are very strong reasons to believe 
that CBA will not lead to decisions that maximize consumption or are 
Kaldor-Hicks optimal. The reason is that the prices CBA must rely 
upon are likely to be highly inaccurate, in the sense that they deviate 
from what individuals would actually be willing to pay or accept 
under conditions of better information. 
For instance, imagine that a workplace-safety regulation could 
save 10 lives at a cost of $100 million. If the value of a statistical life, 
based upon wage-risk studies, is $7 million, then the regulation will 
not be cost-benefit justified and the agency will not promulgate it. But 
what if that value of a statistical life (VSL) is far too low because of 
individuals' affective forecasting errors? If the true VSL-what 
individuals would be willing to pay if they could accurately anticipate 
their own future welfare-were much higher, then the agency's 
failure to promulgate the regulation will decrease welfare. This is 
entirely apart from whether any compensating transfer takes place. 
Conversely, imagine a workplace-safety regulation that will prevent 
10 workers from each losing a finger but cost $3 million. If workers 
have indicated a willingness to pay $500,000 to avoid losing a 
statistical finger, then CBA would favor promulgating this regulation. 
But what if that figure is far too high because workers are failing to 
anticipate their own adaptation? Workers acting under full 
information, including knowledge of their own adaptation, might be 
willing to pay only $100,000 to save a statistical finger. If that is the 
case, then this regulation will similarly decrease welfare, again 
irrespective of whether any compensating transfer takes place. 
The entire premise of our argument for WBA is that these types 
of individual forecasting and prediction errors are commonplace and 
systematic, not merely random or occasional. Over the past decade, 
hedonic psychology has provided abundant evidence in support of 
this point. If we are correct, then CBA will lead to welfare-
diminishing results regardless of whether the tax system is properly 
distributing wealth. CBA will not even lead to proper determinations 
of efficiency when the prices it relies upon are distorted. 
In addition, it would be remiss not to note that the Kaldor-Hicks 
argument rests upon a tenuous assumption: that the tax system 
actually will be used to transfer wealth appropriately. Absent such a 
transfer, a project that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient could well lead to a 
decrease in welfare, as the example in Part 111.A.2 demonstrates. This 
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is why even some of CBA's most sophisticated defenders have 
acknowledged that "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has zero moral 
relevance."243 It is of course difficult to speculate as to whether these 
welfare-enhancing compensating transfers will occur in a meaningful 
fraction of cases, and little reliable data exists. But there is every 
reason to believe that they will be rare, not least of all because they 
involve redistributions from politically powerful groups and 
individuals (the wealthy) to groups and individuals with much less 
political power (the poor).244 
A second, more practical criticism within this line of argument 
might be that if agencies can generate aggregate well-being gains by 
redistributing wealth, they will spend all of their time redistributing 
wealth to the exclusion of other projects and regulations that could 
lead to greater overall improvements in welfare.245 For example, the 
EPA might spend all of its energy transferring wealth from rich to 
poor, rather than regulating hazardous chemicals. But this point 
presupposes that wealth redistribution will dominate WBA in ways 
that are unconnected to the core purposes of the agencies. As our 
sketch of a WBA reveals, this is not the case. The hedonic literature 
suggests a relatively tenuous connection between money and welfare 
for many Americans, so if anything dominates WBA, it is saving lives 
by requiring cleaner air or increased safety.246 Those are the core 
missions of many federal agencies, such as the EPA and OSHA. It is 
243. Adler & Posner, supra note 109, at S265. 
244. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Introduction to FAIRNESS IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams eds., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript 
at 5) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) ("Any proposed distributive change, whether 
accomplished through legal rules or through tax policy, elicits a certain amount of political 
resistance. This resistance may impede movement to a preferred distributive position, or cause 
great welfare losses in the process of achieving such movement."); Edw.ard J. McCaffery, 
Bifurcation Blues: The Perils of Leaving Redistribution Aside 2-3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law 
Colloquium on Tax Policy & Pub. Fin., Working Paper No. 2), available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_1aw_website_academics_colloquia_ta 
x_policy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_074659.pdf (suggesting that " real-world tax policy is 
not up to the burdens that the bifurcation strategy places on it-it is not, that is, situated to 
redistribute in any meaningful way"); cf Share of GDP for Bottom 99th, 95th, and 90th , 
VISUALIZING ECON. (Oct. 17, 2006), http://visualizingeconomics.com/blog/2006/l0/17/share-of-
gdp-99th-95th-90th (showing that the proportion of wealth held by the richest Americans has 
risen over the past 35 years and implying that wealth transfers from wealthy to poor have 
become less common over time). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (setting forth an interest-group 
theory of politics). 
245. We thank Eric Posner for suggesting this point to us. 
246. See supra note 71. 
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true that WBA could result in forcing manufacturers to spend much 
more money to avoid pollution than CBA does, but this is not 
because WBA is dominated by the welfare effects of redistributing 
money. Instead, it is because WBA is weighing the relative welfare 
effects of money and life more accurately than CBA does. 
For that matter, agencies do not have open-ended mandates to 
act in the public interest; they have authority over specific regulatory 
domains and types of activities. Congress and the president could 
simply order the EPA to engage in welfare-justified environmental 
regulation, or to ignore distributional consequences, and then 
separately promulgate a welfare-enhancing tax code if it believed that 
to be appropriate. This is, of course, essentially the current 
governmental division of labor. There is no reason to believe that 
WBA would be an open invitation for agencies to disregard their 
regulatory missions. Indeed, even if it were true that redistribution 
played a large role in WBA, the upshot would simply be that agencies 
should investigate how to enact welfare-justified regulations most 
efficiently. WBA could be adjusted to reduce or eliminate the weight 
it assigns to redistribution when assessing regulations, and then WBA 
could be used again separately to assess distributional consequences 
and recommend tax-and-transfer solutions. 
Finally, CBA's defenders might offer an even more limited 
variation on the themes of these arguments. Although CBA will 
occasionally support projects that diminish welfare, WBA could 
equally favor projects that diminish wealth. To take the simplest 
possible example, a project that causes a wealthy individual to lose 
$1100 and a poor individual to gain $1000 would pass a WBA test 
(because it would increase welfare), just as it would fail a CBA test. 
Over time, defenders of CBA might say, single-minded use of WBA 
would lead to a diminution in national ( or worldwide) wealth, with 
long-term negative consequences.247 For instance, a welfare-enhancing 
but wealth-diminishing project might be so expensive that the 
government would later be unable to implement an additional 
(superior) welfare-enhancing project, leading to the loss of future 
If • 248 we are gams. 
247. We thank Michael Livermore for suggesting this point to us. 
248. This amounts to an argument that WBA may be path dependent. Cf Masur & Posner, 
supra note 15 (arguing that CBA is not similarly path dependent, with the exception of projects 
and regulations that cause substantial unemployment). 
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This argument is correct so far as it goes, though it hardly offers 
a reason to prefer CBA to WBA. A methodology that can lead 
directly to welfare-diminishing results (CBA) is not uniformly 
preferable to one that might conceivably lead indirectly to welfare-
diminishing results at some point in the indefinite future (WBA). 
Nevertheless, it is because of the strength of this argument that we see 
potential value in CBA as a complement to WBA. Although we have 
argued that WBA could replace CBA in the current role that CBA 
plays, it does not necessarily follow that CBA should be left with no 
role at all.249 
Agencies should employ both methodologies. A full specification 
of how an agency might decide among competing projects when CBA 
and WBA disagree, as they often will, is beyond the scope of this 
project. But we can offer a brief sketch. It would be a mistake for an 
agency to promulgate a regulation that fails a WBA test even if it 
passes a CBA test, for that regulation will likely decrease welfare.250 
On the other hand, a regulation that barely passes a WBA test and 
drastically fails a CBA test may be undesirable as well. For 
regulations that pass WBA but fail CBA, agencies should scrutinize 
the ratio of net WBUs gained to net dollars lost. When that ratio is 
very low-small welfare gains at the expense of significant decreases 
in wealth-the agency generally should not promulgate the regulation 
on welfarist grounds, due to the possible indirect harm to welfare of 
wasting dollars that could more efficiently increase welfare by being 
spent otherwise either now or later. One potential way in which 
agencies could determine which ratios are too low might be to 
examine these ratios across large numbers of regulations, past and 
present, to determine how a given regulation compares with historical 
precedent. 
Needless to say, when WBA and CBA conflict, we favor placing 
greater weight on well-being analysis for the many reasons set forth in 
this Article. But we are not unmindful of the valuable role that CBA 
could play as a complement to WBA. 
249. Of course, as we explained above, even CBA's ability to measure increases and 
decreases in wealth is compromised when the prices it relies upon are distorted. Nonetheless, 
the results generated by CBA are almost certainly highly correlated with changes in wealth. 
250. There may certainly be non-welfarist grounds for promulgating regulations, but these 
are separate from what either CBA or WBA tries to measure. 
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IV. WBA AND THE VALUE OF LIVES 
When a regulation would save lives, the value of those lives must 
be assessed so that the value of saving them can be compared with the 
costs necessary to do so.25 1 In Parts I and III, we discussed the basic 
mechanisms by which CBA determines the value of a life. In Part IV, 
we now explore the many subtleties that those mechanisms ignore 
and the ways in which WBA accounts for those subtleties. 
For CBA, every death is typically counted as equivalent to every 
other death; and although many within the CBA community have 
suggested ways to address this problem, some of their most important 
suggestions have rarely been implemented and would constitute only 
partial solutions anyway.252 As CBA is currently conducted, a slow, 
painful death can be equated with a quick death in one's sleep. The 
deaths caused by a terrorist attack can be equated with those that 
occur in skiing accidents. And the death of a 12-year-old is typically 
deemed to diminish overall welfare no more than the death of a 90-
year-old.253 Moreover, CBA often counts all lives equivalently-not 
on supportable moral grounds but on insupportable welfarist 
grounds-such that a life with a debilitating but nonfatal disease is 
said to have as much welfare as a life with perfect health. The 
problem with all of these equivalencies is that such differences affect 
overall welfare, and CBA's stated purpose (like that of WBA) is to 
measure overall welfare. Because WBA accounts for the actual 
effects on welfare of different types of lifesaving regulations, it 
measures the benefit side of the ledger more accurately than does 
CBA. 
251. Some may find it distasteful to place a value on saving a life, but when policy choices 
must be made and trade-offs are necessary, there is no alternative. Any decision will involve 
such a valuation, so it is a virtue that CBA and WBA make their valuations explicit rather than 
hidden. 
252. Recent tweaks to CBA have, on occasion, made slight ameliorations to this problem. 
But as we discuss in Part IV.B, these improvements are far less effective than is WBA at solving 
the problem. 
253. Endless arguments could be made on each side about the moral validity of equating the 
deaths of the young with those of the old, but CBA cannot avail itself of those arguments. Like 
WBA, CBA is simply a tool for measuring aggregate welfare. Its conclusions, like those of 
WBA, purport to tell us whether a regulation increases or decreases quality of life on the whole . 
Once that verdict is in, policymakers can decide what to do with it, and their decision may well 
involve making welfare-independent moral judgments. But when analyzing aggregate welfare 
alone, as CBA does, it is indefensible to equate preserving one year of life with preserving 70 
years of life. The latter unquestionably increases welfare more than does the former, for 
precisely the reason that saving a life at all increases welfare: it grants more time to live. 
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To be sure, CBA has means at its disposal of trying to address 
these problems, and it actually employs some of them. For example, it 
can ask people how much money they would pay to avoid certain 
sorts of risk to life rather than other sorts of risk to life. But that 
approach has the core limitation shared by everything based on 
willingness to pay: it focuses on people's unreliable predictions of 
how certain risks would affect them, rather than on direct 
measurements of how those risks do affect them. WBA solves this 
problem, as we discuss below. 
In Part IV.B, we discuss CBA's capacity to address the problem 
of equating all lives notwithstanding their differences in length and 
quality. First, though, we turn to the issue of equating types of death. 
A. Not All Types of Death Are Equivalent 
1. Different Types of Threats to Life. When policymakers 
consider whether a proposed health and safety regulation is worth its 
cost, the standard cost-benefit approach is to consider how many lives 
are actually likely to be saved.254 This approach, which differentiates 
among risks only in the quantitative terms of their likelihood and 
magnitude, is widely favored by proponents of CBA.255 Indeed, those 
proponents treat this approach as a strength precisely because it 
elevates true dangerousness over public misperceptions thereof.256 
Critics of CBA, however, have attacked this approach by 
pointing out the degree to which it is at odds with people's actual 
views of risk and actual preferences toward regulation.257 For 
example, a CBA analysis by Robert Hahn in 1996 indicated that the 
number of lives likely to be saved by increased airline security was far 
too low to justify the expense.258 Of course, this analysis did not 
foresee the attacks of September 11, 2001, but the more interesting 
issue surrounds what the analysis would have concluded if it had 
foreseen those attacks. As Ackerman and Heinzerling note, the 
254. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 130. 
255. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 61--63 (1993); John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, 
in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SA YEO 183, 193-95 (Robert w. Hahn ed., 1996); Timur Kuran & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REY. 683, 753 (1999); 
Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 245 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989). 
256. See sources cited supra note 255. 
257. See generally A CKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 123-52. 
258. Robert W. Hahn, The Cost of Antiterrorist Rhetoric, 19 REGULATION 51 , 54 (1996). 
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number of people (about 3000) who died on September 11 is dwarfed 
by the number who die from many other causes that are potential 
subjects of regulation.259 Hahn's study itself suggests that "side impact 
standards for automobiles and cabin fire protection in aircraft," which 
are "two-hundred times more cost-effective" than proposals for 
safeguarding airplanes from terrorism, may well have been favored by 
CBA under any circumstances.2(,() For critics, this demonstrates CBA's 
. d 261 ma equacy. 
It seems very likely, however, that most Americans would prefer 
to have thwarted the 9/11 attacks even if doing so had required public 
expenditures that could have saved lives more efficiently if directed 
elsewhere. Such a preference would accord with other findings about 
the way people perceive risk.262 Rather than focusing only on the 
likelihood and magnitude of harm, they also consider the nature of 
the risk.263 "When a hazard is unfamiliar, uncontrollable, involuntary, 
inequitable, dangerous to future generations, irreversible, man-made, 
and/or catastrophic, ordinary people are likely to view it as risky,"264 
whereas "a hazard that is familiar, controllable, voluntary, equitable, 
dangerous only to the present generation, reversible, natural, and/or 
diffusely harmful is unlikely to generate much concern in the 
populace. "265 These views raise important questions about how to 
regulate public health and safety. Many regulatory matters such as 
those involving nuclear power and toxic waste would be resolved one 
way via CBA and a very different way via the views of the public.266 
What WBA adds to the picture is a way of counting the crucial 
fact that people's feelings about risk-not just the statistical 
probability of a risk-affect their well-being.267 Although the fact that 
a risk is "dreaded" does not make that risk any likelier, "[p]rolonged 
exposure to dreaded risks frequently leads to deep and widespread 
anxiety, depression, and distrust. "268 In cataloging these effects, one 
259. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 123-24. 
260. Hahn, supra note 258, at 54. 
261. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 123-24, 136-38. 
262. Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk, 236 Ser. 280, 282 (1987). 
263. Id. 
264. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 130. 
265. Id. 
266. Slovic, supra note 262, at 285. 
267. Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2036-
37 (1999). 
268. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING.supra note 12, at 131. 
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scholar has noted the anger, confusion, and fear produced by the 
risks,269 as well as their deleterious effects on couples210 and children.271 
Another scholar has written at length about the "trauma" imposed by 
dreaded risks.272 Yet another scholar focuses on the breakdown of 
trust that those risks tend to cause.273 
Anxiety, depression, and distrust can diminish well-being 
substantially, and these tangible effects on people clearly must be 
counted by any tool that aims to measure well-being. Indeed, even 
Hahn's CBA study that argued against airplane antiterrorism 
measures acknowledged the possibility that people might "benefit 
psychologically" from such measures.274 That study further 
acknowledged: "It may be that people are willing to pay large sums to 
feel safer," but it concluded that "absent concrete research supporting 
this assertion, the money would be far better spent" elsewhere.275 
In contrast to studies like that one, WBA can be used to forecast 
the effects of regulation on people's well-being. By using hedonic 
data from communities that have been subjected to the relevant risks, 
WBA captures the harms that CBA has been so extensively criticized 
for missing. The reason that people's qualitative judgments of risks 
matter is that those judgments themselves influence, sometimes 
profoundly, people's experience of life. Such influence is the thing 
that WBA exists to measure. 
It is essential to note that WBA does not ignore the actual 
likelihood and magnitude of harm on which CBA focuses. Actual 
deaths, of course, eliminate well-being and are thus profoundly 
weighted in any WBA calculus. This is especially significant because 
the harshest critics of CBA, in pushing for a more democratic 
approach to risk assessment, can be insufficiently sensitive to 
quantitative measures. Hazards that are "familiar," "equitable," and 
269. MICHAEL EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 44--46 (1988). 
270. Id. at 93-95 (noting that, for example, " [s]pouses sometimes held their mates 
responsible for getting them into the situation or for their coping strategy," frequently resulting 
in substantial " marital strife"). 
271. Id. at 98-105. 
272. See generally KAI ERIKSON, A NEW SPECTES OF TROUBLE: EXPLORATIONS IN 
DISASTER, TRAUMA, AND COMMUNITY 226-42 (1994). 
273. Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675, 677-80 
(1993). 
274. Hahn, supra note 258, at 54. 
275. Id. 
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"natural"276 still ought to be taken very seriously if they are likely to 
kill many people. So WBA provides an appropriate mediating 
measure between the critics' focus on psychological triggers of risk 
and the lament of CBA practitioners that the public is simply 
irrational. 
2. Different Types of Death. CBA also chooses not to 
differentiate between quick deaths and slow, painful ones,277 and this 
weakness of CBA reveals one of WBA's strengths. The reason that 
people hope to avoid painful deaths is, simply and obviously, that 
people dislike pain because it decreases their well-being. If we hold 
constant the time at which a person will die278 and contrast two 
different sets of "circumstances preceding death"279 -one in which the 
person is in pain and miserable, and the other in which the person is 
pain-free and relatively happy-several things become clear: (1) the 
person is better off in the pain-free scenario, (2) the reason for this is 
that she feels better in the pain-free scenario, (3) the amount by 
which she is better off is the amount by which she feels better, 
multiplied by the amount of time during which she feels better, and 
(4) the better a tool of analysis takes account of these facts, the better 
it captures the likely effects of a policy on human well-being. WBA is 
designed precisely to account for these considerations. CBA ignores 
them in practice, and even in theory it could address such concerns 
only via proxies that are less reliable and less direct than those of 
WBA. 
3. How One Person's Death Affects Another Person's Welfare. 
CBA counts death as a cost to the person who died,280 but not as a 
cost to others who may be affected by that person's death. We 
mimicked that practice in our example of WBA earlier in this Article, 
but in actual policymaking this is a mistake that should be corrected. 
276. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 130. 
277. See id. at 70-71 ("[T]he circumstances preceding death are important: sudden, painless 
death in pleasant circumstances is different from agonizing, slow deterioration surrounded by 
medical technology."). 
278. If the time of death would actually differ, such that a slow death would increase the 
length of life, then of course this should be factored in as well. WBA does factor it in, whereas 
CBA does not. See infra Part IV.B. 
279. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 71. 
280. Or, to use CBA's preferred terminology, it counts the cost of subjecting the members 
of a population to an increased risk of death. We believe that this amounts to the same thing. 
See supra note 42. 
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WBA is well-positioned to do so, because hedonic data already exist 
about the effect of people's deaths on those close to them.281 By 
contrast, CBA would have to add this element by asking people how 
much money they would be willing to pay to avoid losing a loved one 
( or to avoid a risk to that person's life). Such an approach implicates 
all of the problems with CBA we discuss throughout this Article, such 
as wealth effects, hypothetical questions, and people's difficulty in 
thinking about infinitesimally small numbers, among others. But the 
largest problem, as may always be the case with CBA, is that it 
requires people to guess the effect of something on their life in the 
future . How much welfare do people lose when their loved ones die? 
Instead of relying on what people predict the effect will be, along with 
their capacity to convert that effect into dollar figures, it is better to 
rely on measures of how such deaths actually affect people's 
happiness, as measured by their in-the-moment self-reports at various 
stages of time after the deaths. Hedonic studies measure precisely 
that.282 
B. CBA 's Attempted Improvements 
When considering whether or not to regulate a risk to human 
health, CBA quantifies the value of that risk primarily by determining 
the number of lives likely to be saved by regulation and multiplying it 
by the statistical value of a human life. The value of a statistical life 
(VSL) is computed using the various methods described in Parts I and 
III. Accordingly, its reliability suffers from the methodological limits 
discussed above. In addition, CBA's use of statistical lives also has 
conceptual faults. When determining an average value for lives saved, 
VSL treats the lives saved by regulation indiscriminately. In doing so, 
VSL ignores essential data regarding both the length and quality of 
the lives protected. Regulations that prolong or improve the quality 
of life without "saving" it are not counted by CBA formulas relying 
on VSL.283 
Over the past several decades, scholars and policymakers have 
developed new tools to overcome VSL's limitations. This Section 
discusses two such tools-"value of statistical life years" (VSL Ys) and 
281. See, e.g., Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 80. 
282. See, e.g., id. 
283. As we explain in the next Section, no regulation actually saves lives; it merely prolongs 
them. To the extent CBA focuses on saving lives, it is measuring the value of lives that 
presumably would have ended more or less immediately without the regulation. 
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"quality-adjusted life years" (QALYs). The movement toward 
VSLYs and QALYs represents an acknowledgment of the limitations 
of traditional CBA methods. The inadequacy of equating all lives 
saved with one another is the impetus for moving beyond VSL. But 
VSLYs and QALYs are merely way stations on the road from CBA 
to WBA. They are efforts to bend CBA to be more sensitive to the 
nuances it has been ignoring. But no such tweaks can solve the 
problem as comprehensively as can WBA, as the following 
Subsections explain. 
l. Statistical Lives and Life Years. When standard CBA is 
applied to regulations that seek to protect human health and welfare, 
policymakers calculate the benefits side of the equation by predicting 
the number of lives likely to be saved by the proposed regulation.284 
To compare the number of lives saved to the costs of the regulation 
(for example, in higher prices, unemployment, etc.), the value of 
those lives must be monetized. Thus, each life saved must be assigned 
a specific monetary value. CBA derives this value-known as VSL-
by reference to the various techniques discussed in Parts I and III: 
revealed preference and contingent valuation studies.285 
As noted in Part III, the techniques used to derive VSL have 
considerable methodological limitations. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the conceptual relationship between VSL and the welfare-
maximizing goals of regulation is deeply strained.286 By focusing solely 
on lives saved, CBA's use of VSL entirely ignores data that are 
relevant to judging the value of regulation. For VSL, the length of the 
life saved is immaterial.287 By ignoring longevity, CBA risks creating 
highly counterintuitive results. Imagine, for example, that the 
government has a finite supply of a vaccine for a deadly disease that 
has recently broken out, and it can provide that vaccine either to 100 
children or 101 hospice patients. Under CBA, using the VSL 
approach, the government should prefer to give the drug to the 
hospice patients, because doing so would potentially save one 
284. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 47 (explaining that reduced mortality risk 
is one of the greatest justifications for the EPA's cost-benefit decisions). 
285. Id. at 47-49. 
286. We do not here discuss other extra-welfarist goals of regulation. 
287. Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness To Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 
208 (2004); see also James K. Hammitt, Valuing Changes in Mortality Risk: Lives Saved Versus 
Life Years Saved, 1 REv. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 228, 229-31 (2007) (discussing differences 
between VSL and VSL Y measures). 
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additional life. We doubt, however, that anyone would suggest that 
giving the vaccine to the hospice patients increases overall welfare. 
After all, the benefit from the drug will likely only prolong the lives of 
the hospice patients for a few weeks, whereas the children might be 
expected to live for decades. 
In response to these kinds of problems, scholars have suggested 
that regulators consider instead the number of "life years" at issue.288 
Rather than relying simply on statistical lives, researchers should 
calculate the value of a statistical life year (VSL Y), which involves 
dividing the VSL by the average life expectancy of the subjects of the 
studies.289 VSL Y has an estimated value of approximately $180,000.290 
Looking again at the vaccine example from the perspective of VSLY, 
the answer is obvious and intuitive: 100 children x 50 life years per 
child x $180,000 = $90 million; 101 hospice patients x 0.1 life years per 
patient x $180,000 = $1.8 million. By considering the number of life 
years saved by regulation, the VSL Y method offers a closer proxy for 
the actual welfare value at stake.291 
Nonetheless, the VSL Y approach has been criticized both for its 
lack of empirical support and the potential outcomes that it 
generates.292 These concerns are based on the claim that VSLY 
inappropriately undervalues the lives of older people. Empirically, in 
surveys of WTP to avoid risk, there is mixed evidence about whether 
older people actually value risk less than younger people, as VSL Y 
would suggest.293 Although some studies show that willingness to pay 
to avoid risk declines with age, as one might expect, some show no 
difference and others show the inverse.294 According to Richard 
288. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 206 ("(I]t is sensible to think that government should 
consider not simply the number of lives at stake, or the VSL; it should concern itself also or 
instead with the number of life-years at stake, or the value of statistical life-years .... "). 
289. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 78. 
290. See id. (using $180,000 as an example VSL Y value). 
291. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 208 ("If the goal is to promote people's welfare by 
lengthening their lives, a regulation that saves five hundred life-years (and, let us say, twenty-
five people) is, other things being equal, better than a regulation that saves fifty life-years ( also, 
let us say, twenty-five people)."). 
292. We do not here discuss concerns about whether VSL Ys enact illegal age discrimination. 
For discussion, see id. at 220. 
293 . REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 81 ("Relevant studies have found that the 
willingness to pay does not resemble the constant age-dependent discount postulated by 
proponents of the life-years method."). 
294. See Alberini et al. , supra note 227, at 771 (finding no significant difference between 
older and younger people); V. Kerry Smith, Mary F. Evans, Hyun Kim & Donald H. Taylor, Jr., 
Do the Near-Elderly Value Mortality Risks Differently? , 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 423, 423 (2004) 
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Revesz and Michael Livermore, the failure to observe a decrease in 
WTP should not be surprising in light of the typically higher wealth of 
older people and the greater scarcity of the limited years they have 
• • 295 remammg. 
In situations in which the data appear to diverge from the theory, 
however, it is just as possible that the data are misleading as it is that 
the theory is incorrect. There are a number of plausible explanations 
for the finding that older people are sometimes willing to pay more to 
avoid risk than younger people. Many of these explanations do not 
undermine the idea that saving more life years saves more welfare. 
For example, as Revesz and Livermore note, older people typically 
have greater wealth than younger people do, and wealth is strongly 
correlated with increased WTP.2% If the greater WTP on the part of 
older people is based upon wealth, it should be treated as a 
confounding factor rather than evidence of welfare. Additionally, 
"older people have less to do with their money" and fewer other 
options for spending it, as saving is not a strong priority.297 Further, 
when valuing goods and risks in contingent valuation studies, people 
often demonstrate significant "scope neglect." For instance, they are 
often willing to pay the same amount to save 1000, 10,000, or 100,000 
birds from some type of hazard.298 Plausibly, then, when 40-year-olds 
and 70-year-olds are asked to value losing "the rest of your life" they 
may treat these different time periods similarly. 
Whereas opponents of VSL contend that the use of VSL Y exacts 
a "senior death discount"299 because it treats the lives of older people 
as less valuable than those of younger people, we view this 
discrepancy as consistent with our intuitions about the remaining 
welfare associated with those lives. Younger people will , on average, 
have greater welfare left to enjoy than do older people. As Cass 
Sunstein has suggested, people placed behind a "veil of ignorance" 
would overwhelmingly favor regulations that save more life years.300 
(finding that older people have higher WTP than younger people); Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 
195, at 50 (finding that older people have lower WTP than younger people). 
295 . REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 80-81. 
296. Id. 
297. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 233. 
298. Desvousges et al. , supra note 106, at 113. 
299. R EVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 79 (quotation marks omitted). 
300. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 214-15 ("If people do not know how old they are, would 
they have the slightest difficulty concluding that it is better to eliminate a 1/50,000 risk faced by 
one million teenagers than a 1/50,000 risk faced by one million senior citizens?"). 
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To the extent one is trying to maximize welfare, it is better to save 30-
year-olds than 80-year-olds. 
2. Quality-Adjusted Life Years. We consider the VSLY approach 
to be a substantial improvement over the VSL technique traditionally 
favored by CBA. However, although VSLY directs attention to 
welfare-relevant data overlooked by VSL, the life-years approach 
itself ignores a meaningful component of the value of risk regulation: 
the quality of the years saved. As with the VSL approach, this has the 
potential to create counterintuitive results. For example, the life-years 
approach would be indifferent between (1) a program that extended 
the lives of 100 people for 10 years with those years spent in poor 
health, and (2) a program that extended the lives of 100 people for 10 
years with those years spent in excellent health. Despite people's 
capacity to adapt hedonically to certain types of poor health,301 there 
is almost certainly a greater welfare gain in the second program 
because poor health will almost always be associated with meaningful 
hd . 1· 302 e omc pena ties. 
To remedy this shortcoming, some scholars have recommended 
adopting quality-adjusted life years (QAL Ys) in cost-benefit 
analysis.303 The QAL Y was initially developed in the related field of 
cost-effectiveness analysis to provide data on the efficient use of 
scarce resources in medical decisionmaking.304 Unlike the VSL and 
VSLY approaches, QALYs were not initially designed with respect to 
standard welfare theory ,305 but some commentators306 -including 
courts307 and agencies308 -see value in the use of QAL Y s in CBA. As 
301. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 112, at 1527-28. 
302. Id. at 1531. 
303. See Sunstein, supra note 287, at 246. 
304. Milton C. Weinstein, George Torrance & Alistair McGuire, QALYs: The Basics, 12 
VALUE HEALTH S5 , S5 (2009). 
305. Amiram Gafni, Economic Evaluation of Health-Care Programmes: ls CEA Better Than 
CBA? , 34 ENVTL. &RESOURCE ECON. 407,408 (2006). 
306. Adler, supra note 209, at 1044. 
307. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F .3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (suggesting that 
QAL Ys may be used by agencies to develop tools for judging harm), rev'd in part sub nom. 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
308. Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test Procedures and 
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,404, 15,411 (proposed Mar. 31, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 800 (2012)). 
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yet, however, QALY analysis faces a number of methodological 
hurdles before it can be successfully incorporated into CBA.309 
QAL Y analysis requires researchers to determine the relative 
values of living in different health states. The goal is to arrange 
various health states along a quantitative, cardinal dimension in which 
1.0 is equivalent to perfect health and 0 is death.310 The quality-
adjusted value of a health state is then multiplied by the number of 
life years spent in that state to determine the QAL Y.311 Thus, if a 
treatment option will extend a person's life by 10 years but in less 
than full health (say, 0.7), it generates 7 QAL Ys. Such a treatment 
would be preferred over a treatment that extended a person's life by 
12 years at worse health (say, 0.4 = 4.8 QALYs) or one that extended 
the person's life 5 years in full health (5 QAL Ys). 
To generate values for the necessary quality adjustments, 
researchers rely on three principle survey techniques. Subjects may be 
asked to use rating scales such as the EuroQol, a five-item scale that 
asks subjects to simply compare health states that differ on a variety 
of dimensions such as pain, mobility, and self-care.312 In time trade-off 
studies, subjects are asked to choose between being in a state of poor 
health for a set period of time or being in full health for a shorter 
period.313 In "standard gamble" studies, subjects choose between ill 
health for a period of time or a treatment that has a chance of 
restoring them to full health and a chance of death.314 Researchers 
then use the subjects' responses to calculate the relative value of, say, 
walking with a cane and being confined to a wheelchair. 
The first difficulty with adopting QAL Y analysis as part of 
traditional CBA is determining how to monetize QALYs. When 
QALYs are used in cost-effectiveness analysis in healthcare 
decisionmaking, no effort is made to quantify the value of a QALY. 
Instead, different programs may be compared to one another or a 
309. See generally John Broome, Qalys, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 149 (1993). 
310. Thomas Klose, A Utility-Theoretic Model for QALYs and Willingness To Pay , 12 
HEALTH ECON. 17, 20 (2003). A QAL Y is "a utility-based, cardinal, interpersonally 
comparable, and time-dependent measure of effectiveness based on preferences over health and 
time." Id. at 17. 
311. Gafni , supra note 305, at 412. 
312. How To Use EQ-5D, EUROQOL GRP., http://www.euroqol.org/about-eq-5d/how-to-
use-eq-5d.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) . 
313. Cam Donaldson, Stephen Birch & Amiram Gafni, The Distributional Problem in 
Economic Evaluation: Income and the Valuation of Costs and Consequences of Health Care 
Programmes, 11 HEALTH ECON. 55, 60--61 (2002). 
314. Id. at 60. 
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program may be compared to an arbitrary threshold.3 15 This resistance 
to quantifying the value of health and life has likely played a role in 
making QALYs attractive to healthcare professionals,316 but it has 
done so at the cost of providing a clear decision rule.317 To provide 
such a rule, scholars have attempted to calculate a constant WTP-per-
QAL Y figure that can be plugged in to CBA. As yet, however, no 
clear number has been developed.318 This difficulty may arise for some 
of the same reasons that calculating the value of a life year is a 
problem-framing effects, prospect theory, scarcity, and the like.319 
More problematic, however, is the method that researchers use 
to elicit QAL Y values. Just as contingent valuation studies suffer 
from having people attach monetary values to things like health and 
the environment that are difficult to think about and monetize, 
QAL Y studies often require healthy individuals to make value 
judgments about health states that they have never experienced. To 
be valuable in welfare analysis, QALYs should reflect how people 
feel in various states of health. Instead, when healthy people are 
asked about states of poor health they will tend to provide answers 
about how they feel about those health states.320 A rich empirical 
literature that we have discussed in a previous article demonstrates 
individuals' inability to accurately assess the value of health states 
they have not experienced.321 Healthy people regularly overestimate 
both the magnitude and duration of the hedonic impact of many 
negative health states, including cancer, dialysis treatment, paralysis, 
and colostomy.322 When asked to think about these negative health 
states, healthy people suffer from a number of cognitive and affective 
315. See Richard A . Hirth, Michael E. Chernew, Edward Miller, A. Mark Fendrick & 
William G . Weissert, Willingness To Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a 
Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 333 (2000). 
316. Gafni , supra note 305, at 410. 
317. Hirth et al. , supra note 315, at 332. 
318 . Hirth and his coauthors found WTP/QAL Y figures ranging from $24,000 to $428,000 
with an average of $265,000, but they failed to find "a strong central tendency." Id. at 338-39; 
see also Paul Dolan & Richard Edlin, ls It Really Possible To Build a Bridge Between Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 827, 838 (2002) 
(concluding that reconciling CBA and CEA is impossible and recommending that the debate 
focus on determining which approach is more appropriate for a given situation). 
319. See Daniel Kahneman, A Different Approach to Health State Valuation , 12 VALUE 
HEALTH S16, S16 (2009). 
320. See Daniel M. Hausman, Valuing Health , 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 246, 256 (2006). 
321. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur. , supra note 112, at 1526-35. 
322. For a review, see Paul Dolan & Daniel Kahneman, Interpretations of Utility and Their 
Implications for the Valuation of Health , 118 ECON. J . 215 , 221-22 (2008). 
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biases that hinder their judgment: they neglect the role of hedonic 
adaptation, they focus primarily on the transition from good to poor 
health, and their attention is focused on the health domain to the 
exclusion of other domains.323 Thus, in time trade-off and standard 
gamble studies, healthy people are willing to give up significantly 
more remaining life than are current patients.324 This results in biased 
QAL Y scores that overestimate the welfare losses from many health 
states.325 
Although asking current or former patients to respond to these 
studies might help, it is unlikely to resolve all measurement issues. 
Time trade-off and standard gamble studies, like contingent valuation 
and revealed preference studies, rely on what Daniel Kahneman has 
called decision utility: subjects make judgments about the value of 
past or future states of the world. In addition to the prediction 
problems listed above, such studies also suffer from cognitive biases 
associated with recollection of past states. For example, colonoscopy 
patients have been shown to prefer longer, more painful procedures 
to shorter, less painful ones when the former ended with a period of 
diminished but still significant pain.326 It is also possible that current 
and former patients who are adapting or have adapted to their 
conditions may neglect the preadaptation period during which their 
condition was causing substantial welfare losses.327 
3. Well-Being Units. Our proposal to replace CBA with WBA is 
based on the ability of WBA to solve the conceptual and 
methodological limitations associated with measuring the value of 
323. Id. at 223. 
324. See, e.g., David L. Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States 
as Perceived by the General Public, 31 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697, 702 (1978) (reporting QAL Ys 
for dialysis treatment of 0.39 and 0.56 for healthy subjects and patients, respectively). Often, 
patients are willing to sacrifice no or very little life, resulting in QAL Y scores at or near 1.0 for a 
variety of diseases. See Erik Nord, Norman Daniels & Mark Kamlet, QAL Ys: Some Challenges, 
12 VALUE HEALTH SIO, Sl0-11 (2009) (noting that "unwillingness to trade lifetime in 
elicitations of experienced utility" is an issue). 
325. It is worth noting that other relatively minor negative health states prove surprisingly 
resistant to adaptation, such as ringing in the ears and chronic headaches. To the extent that the 
public does not predict the substantial hedonic losses associated with these conditions, QAL Y 
scores will underestimate welfare losses. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 112, at 
1541. 
326. Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients' Memories of Painful Medical 
Treatments: Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures, 
116 PAIN 3, 7 (1996). 
327. Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 322, at 225. 
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life. WBA incorporates the valuable corrections offered by VSL Y s 
and QAL Y s while avoiding their shortcomings. As noted in Part 
IV.B.1, CBA's preferred tool, VSL, provides a weak proxy for 
general intuitions about welfare because it neglects data about both 
the longevity and the quality of life. The VSL Y and QAL Y 
approaches go some distance toward solving this issue, but they run 
into problems of their own. 
The well-being units that we propose can be thought of as 
QAL Ys derived from experienced utility rather than decision utility. 
By using elicitation techniques that more or less directly measure 
subjective well-being, WBA can generate a more accurate measure of 
both the quantity and quality of the value of life. Ecological-
momentary assessment, day-reconstruction method, and quality-of-
life surveys provide data on the lived experiences of people in a wide 
variety of states.328 Accordingly, they can measure the value of a 
broader spectrum of experiences, including not just health risk but 
also the impact on well-being of social, professional, and 
environmental factors. WBA is also more attuned to the importance 
of emotional well-being, including positive emotions, which are 
almost entirely ignored by CBA.329 
In addition to proving a more nuanced and accurate picture of 
the quality of life, the techniques used by WBA avoid a number of 
the methodological problems faced by various versions of CBA. The 
cognitive biases that hinder contingent valuation, revealed 
preferences, and QAL Y studies are substantially muted in WBA. 
Respondents are only asked to answer simple questions rating their 
current level of happiness. Such questions do not require them to 
value nonmarket goods, make complex health trade-offs, or predict 
or remember different experiences. As such, they are less susceptible 
to wealth effects, demand effects, framing effects, and affective 
forecasting errors.330 Unlike traditional CBA and QALY analysis, 
which require people to make incredibly difficult judgments about the 
monetary or health value of things they have never experienced, 
328. See supra Part II.B. 
329. The converse is similarly true. Matthew Adler notes that CBA analyses "almost never 
enumerate and price the distressing mental states, such as fear, anxiety, worry, panic, or dread, 
that are causally connected to environmental, occupational, and consumer hazards and would 
(or at least might) be reduced by more stringent regulation." Adler, supra note 209, at 997. 
330. For a description of the distortions to CBA caused by these biases and errors, see supra 
Part III. 
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WBA directly tracks people's experiences and the emotions that 
those experiences create. 
Finally, because WBA does not attempt to translate experiences 
into money, it avoids difficult problems associated with monetizing 
QALYs. In WBA, the costs and benefits of proposed policies are 
hedonized, and their impact on people's well-being is weighed. To the 
extent that a policy increases or decreases wealth, the effects of the 
changes in wealth on welfare will be measured directly.331 Moreover, 
the value of a year at a certain level of well-being is less likely to be 
altered by the effects of age or wealth than are VSLs, VSL Y s, and 
QALYs. 
V. DISCOUNTING IN CBA AND WBA 
One of the most intractable problems within CBA involves the 
choice of a discount rate.332 CBA is based upon monetary values, and 
the value of money is not constant across time.333 A dollar is not worth 
the same amount in 2011 as it was in 2001, much less 1911. It is better 
to have one dollar today than one dollar one year from today. In 
addition, governmental projects and regulations do not always 
produce benefits in the same years that they generate costs.334 For 
instance, a regulation that banned emphysema-causing chemicals in 
the workplace might create immediate costs-firms that used those 
chemicals would have to eliminate them immediately and find safer 
( and presumably more expensive) alternatives. But the benefits 
would arrive only several years later, because emphysema is a slow-
onset disease that typically takes years to develop.335 CBA would thus 
measure the costs of such a regulation in 2011 dollars, and the 
benefits in (for instance) 2021 dollars, which are less valuable. To 
make a true apples-to-apples comparison, the agency would then be 
331. See, e.g., Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 106, at 1071 (discussing the possibility of 
estimating monetary compensating variations for changes in well-being). 
332. See Adler & Posner, supra note 215, at 1142 (showing that agency freedom to choose a 
different discount rate for every regulation has led to large disparities in measuring benefits). 
333. Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 107-08 (2005) (explaining the 
concept of a discount rate). 
334. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, 
Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 180 (2007) (using the regulation of 
arsenic as an example of a government program that would impose present costs but provide 
benefits in the form of reduced cancer rates decades in the future). 
335. See Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. 
(May 1, 2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH00011S3. 
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forced to discount the 2021 benefits to present value-effectively 
determining what those 2021 benefits are worth in 2011 terms. 
The mathematics behind such discounting are easy. What is 
difficult is determining the proper discount rate to use. That is, how 
much less is a benefit in 2012 worth than a benefit in 2011? Ten 
percent less? Seven percent? Five or three percent? The answer can 
have a significant impact upon regulatory decisions. For instance, 
consider the question of how aggressively the United States should 
regulate to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. In 2009, the Obama 
administration convened a multiagency working group to determine 
how much harm was being done to the world economy by global 
warming on account of greenhouse-gas emissions.336 The working 
group calculated the cost to the world for each ton of carbon dioxide 
emitted, in U.S. dollars.337 Many of the harms from global warming 
will only occur 50 or even 100 years from now, and so it was necessary 
to discount those harms to present-day dollars. However, as is often 
the case, the agency could not settle on a single discount rate. Instead, 
it reported the cost of carbon emissions at three different discount 
rates: 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent. The results are reported 
in Table 4, below. 
Table 4: Worldwide Cost of Emitting One Ton of Carbon Dioxide at 
Various Discount Rates (in 2011 dollars/38 
-
5% I 3 % I 2.5% I 
$4.90 $21.90 $35.7~ 
As is evident from the table, the choice of discount rate has a 
tremendous effect on the estimate of harm. Halving the discount rate, 
from 5 percent to 2.5 percent, more than septuples the cost of each ton 
of carbon dioxide. This is because a cost or benefit that occurs in the 
distant future must be discounted heavily when translating it into 
2011 dollars-the value of the cost decreases 5 percent ( or 2.5 
percent) per year. Over several decades, small differences in the 
discount rate compound into substantial divergences in overall costs. 
Accordingly, it is no exaggeration to say that the choice between a 2.5 
percent discount rate and a 5 percent discount rate could determine 
336. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1557, 1561. 
337. Id. at 1577- 79. 
338. Id. at 1580 (listing values for 2011). 
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whether the United States regulates greenhouse-gas emissions fairly 
. 1 11339 stnngent y, or not at a . 
Why is it difficult for agencies and other decisionmakers to select 
a discount rate? The reason is that there is no agreement about 
precisely why discounting is necessary; and even when there is 
agreement on the reasons for discounting, there is no agreement on 
what discount rate would be proper given the rationale behind 
discounting. 
The predominant reason that future costs and benefits must be 
discounted is the "time value of money"-the fact that one dollar is 
not worth the same amount at every point in time. This is partly 
because of inflation: one dollar buys fewer goods and services in 2011 
than it bought in 1911.340 It is also because money can earn interest if 
it is saved, rather than spent. For instance, imagine a regulation that 
would require an expenditure of $10,000 in 2011 and yield $15,000 of 
benefits in 2021. Is this regulation worth enacting? One approach is to 
consider how much $15,000 is worth in 2021, compared with $10,000 
in 2011. This would involve calculating the rate of inflation and 
determining which sum of money has more purchasing power in the 
given year. If this approach is correct, then the discount rate should 
be the long-term rate of inflation, which is approximately 2.4 
percent.341 Another approach is to ask how much the original $10,000 
would be worth in 2021 if it were invested, instead of being spent on 
complying with the regulation.342 If this approach is correct, then the 
discount rate should be the typical long-term rate of return on an 
investment of that size.343 There is a great deal of disagreement 
339. See id. at 1598-99 (arriving at the same conclusion); David Weisbach & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 433, 440 (2009) ("[B]ecause of the potentially profound effect of discount rates, 
these figures are central to major disagreements over climate change policy."). 
340. See Overview of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2012). 
341. See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U .S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT: DATA 
FOR DECEMBER 2012, at 78 tbl.24 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid12l2.pdf. The 
average inflation rate between 2002 and 2012 was calculated by the authors based upon the data 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
342. See, e.g. , Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 339, at 435-36. 
343. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With 
or Without the Social Contrivance of Money , 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 (1958). 
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regarding what that rate of return is, but most estimates place it at 7 
percent.344 
Thus, even when the discount rate is based purely on the time 
value of money, different approaches to calculating that value can 
produce widely divergent results. Many administrative agencies avoid 
this issue by refusing to decide between these approaches and 
calculating cost-benefit analyses with both of them. For instance, the 
Office of Management and Budget recommends that agencies use a 7 
percent discount rate but perform cost-benefit analyses with both 3 
percent and 7 percent discount rates.345 Most agencies follow this 
advice, including OSHA and the EPA. 346 Yet the choice among those 
discount rates is often determinative of whether a regulation 
produces more benefits than costs.347 Consider the emphysema 
example from the previous paragraphs. At a 3 percent discount rate, 
the regulation would provide approximately $11,160 in benefits, 
discounted to their 2011 value.348 But at a 7 percent discount rate, the 
regulation provides only $7,600 in benefits-far below the $10,000 in 
costs.349 
CBA has no way to avoid these difficulties. But WBA does. 
Unlike money, well-being is time invariant. Five WBUs in 2021 are 
worth just as much in welfare terms as 5 WBUs in 2011. Indeed, the 
entire reason that the value of money varies over time is that the 
amount of well-being it can be used to purchase varies over time. 
Thus, there is no need to discount in order to accommodate the time-
value of well-being. Many of the difficulties with discounting that 
force EPA to report results at two different discount rates, and the 
344. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-
94, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS 9 (1992), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094 ("Constant-
dollar benefit-cost analyses of proposed investments and regulations should report net present 
value and other outcomes determined using a real discount rate of 7 percent. This rate 
approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average investment in the private sector 
in recent years."). 
345. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 33-34 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
circulars_a004_a-4. 
346. See, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 672 (describing OSHA's use of both 7 
percent and 3 percent discount rates in a CBA of hexavalent chromium exposure standards). 
347. See, e.g. , id. at 673 (reporting the divergent results for a CBA of an OSHA regulation 
conducted at 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates); Masur & Posner, supra note 138, at 629 
tbl.5 (reporting the same for an EPA regulation). 
348. The calculation is $15,000 / (1.03)'0 = $11,161.41. 
349. Similarly, the calculation is $15,000 / (1.07) 10 = $7,625.24. 
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interagency climate change working group to do so at three different 
rates, are simply irrelevant to WBA. 
That is not to say that WBA will necessarily be able to avoid 
discounting entirely. We noted above that there is no agreement on 
precisely why (or whether) discounting should occur. In the preceding 
paragraphs, we described a leading theory: inflation and the 
possibility of investment interest alter the value of money over time. 
However, there are other candidate theories that are not so easily 
dealt with by WBA. For instance, it might be that individuals simply 
have pure time preferences for immediate gratification over later 
benefits.350 Someone might prefer having 6 WBUs today and 5 WBUs 
tomorrow to the reverse. This could be driven by the fear that the 
individual will die before she is able to enjoy the more distant 
rewards, or it could simply be human impatience.351 Alternatively, 
there might be some separate moral reason to privilege present 
welfare over future welfare (for example, a duty to one's own 
generation), or conceivably the reverse (a duty to future 
generations). 352 
We take no position on whether discounting is appropriate for 
any of these reasons, though we note that the case for doing so has 
not been conclusively established.353 If discounting is appropriate, 
then well-being analysis will have to include discounting as well. But 
for CBA, this discounting would be above and beyond any 
discounting that might be necessary due to inflation and interest 
rates. CBA would have two sets of problems to sort through. WBA 
simplifies the issue at least by half. And when it comes to such a 
thorny and yet potentially decisive issue as what discount rate to 
select, that constitutes progress. 
350. See Revesz, supra note 11, at 997-1002 (describing the argument for pure time 
preferences); see also IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: As DETERMINED BY 
IMPATIENCE To SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT25-32 (1930) (same). 
351. Revesz, supra notell, at 997-1002. 
352. See Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 339, at 445. 
353. See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE 
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 155 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds. , 
1992) (arguing that pure time preferences are irrational). We note as well that there is a 
significant literature regarding whether a zero discount rate (which is equivalent to a decision 
not to discount) would produce one or more paradoxes. See, e.g. , Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 
334, at 175-77 (2007); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis , 74 U . CHI. 
L. REV. 209, 216-17 (2007). Further research will be necessary to determine whether these 
paradoxes would apply with the same force-or with any force-to WBA employing WBUs. 
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CONCLUSION 
For decades, cost-benefit analysis has been the primary tool by 
which policymakers analyze prospective laws and administrative 
regulations. Hundreds of millions of lives have been affected 
profoundly by the answers that CBA generates. All along, critics from 
within and without have pointed to the fact that CBA relies primarily 
on mechanisms-such as contingent valuation surveys (how much 
would you pay to save 20,000 birds?) and wage premiums (how much 
more do dangerous jobs pay than safe ones?)-that have been 
demonstrated to yield unreliable and invalid data. But CBA persists 
because no compelling rival account has emerged to replace it. 
We offer well-being analysis as an alternative. WBA aims to 
measure how people actually experience their lives: what makes them 
happy and unhappy, and what they enjoy and dislike. Instead of 
introducing the distortions created by using money as a proxy for 
people's quality of life, WBA analyzes that quality directly. 
Psychological studies of hedonic well-being have yielded data that 
pass the same canonical tests of social science that CBA's studies fail. 
Those hedonic studies, which form the backbone of WBA, provide 
the same capability for numerical comparison of policy choices as 
does CBA. The difference is that WBA's answers avoid many of the 
pitfalls that plague CBA. 
Although WBA is not meant to answer the ultimate question of 
what policies should be chosen,354 we think it improves upon CBA in 
playing a key role in the decisionmaking process: the role of assessing 
policies' effects on the quality of human life. That need not be the 
only consideration in making policy,355 but it is at minimum an 
important one. 
Scholars, regulators, and even heads of state have known for 
years of CBA's weaknesses. But they have felt compelled nonetheless 
to accept CBA on the ground that an attempt at rigorous comparison 
is preferable to the absence of any comparison at all. WBA offers a 
viable alternative or complement. The question is not whether WBA 
is perfect-no tool of social policy is-but rather whether it 
constitutes an improvement upon the status quo. The answer may 
well be yes. 
354. Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 52-{il. We adopt the same "weak welfarist" position 
that Adler and Posner favor, using WBA in addition to or in place of CBA to measure welfare. 
355. Id. 
